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Sexual harassment law and family leave policy originated as feminist reform 
projects designed to protect women in the workplace. But many academics now ask 
whether harassment and leave policies have outgrown their gendered roots. The 
anti-bullying movement advocates taking the “sexual” out of harassment law to 
prohibit all forms of on-the-job mistreatment. Likewise, the work-life balance 
movement advocates taking the “family” out of leave policy to require employers 
to accommodate all types of life pursuits. These proposals are in line with recent 
cases and scholarship on civil rights that reframe problems once seen as issues of 
inequality as deprivations of liberty or dignity. I refer to this trend as the universal 
turn in workplace protections. 
This Article urges caution with respect to the universal turn. Drawing on 
feminist legal and political theory, it provides a set of questions to ask in evaluating 
proposals to universalize protections. It concludes that anti-bullying and work-life 
proposals are likely to dilute feminist workplace gains and mask inequality. If the 
universal rule swallows the antidiscrimination rule, the transformative potential of 
requiring employers and the public to scrutinize the workplace for gender 
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discrimination is lost. Sexual harassment is seen as no worse than personality 
conflicts, and recreational pursuits are supported to the same extent as caretaking 
responsibilities. The benefits of sexual harassment law and leave policy are likely 
to be diluted. 
I therefore oppose universal approaches to harassment and work-life conflicts 
that would simply expand civil rights protections to cover harms other than 
discrimination. Instead of the universal turn, this Article proposes a hybrid 
approach focused on inclusivity that would expand protections incrementally 
without abandoning equality. 
INTRODUCTION 
There is no “general civility code for the American workplace.”1 If you are 
barraged with vicious insults on the job or you are so overworked that you cannot 
maintain your sanity, chances are, you have no legal remedy. Legal protections 
attach only if the poor treatment was based on sex or another protected 
characteristic. Sexual harassment law and family leave originated as policies to 
redress injuries to women. The paradigmatic cases: a woman suffers hostile sexual 
advances from a male supervisor,2 or is fired for taking time off to have a child.3 As 
required by the principle of formal equality, men too could bring sexual harassment 
cases4 or take time off for children.5 In many workplaces, the prevailing idea of 
sexual harassment has further expanded to include almost all forms of on-the-job 
sexual expression,6 and the concept of family responsibilities has further expanded 
to include new forms of caretaking, such as care for elderly parents.7 But these 
workplace protections remain moored to gender, sex, and family.  
A trend is now emerging to abandon these moorings. Many scholars propose 
expanding actionable forms of harassment beyond the sexual, to nonsexual 
workplace bullying.8 Likewise, scholars propose expanding leave policy beyond 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 2. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986). 
 3. See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 278 (1987). 
 4. See generally Aimee L. Widor, Comment, Fact or Fiction?: Role-Reversal Sexual 
Harassment in the Modern Workplace, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 225 (1996) (discussing sexual 
harassment cases involving male victims and female perpetrators). 
 5. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731, 734 (2003) 
(stating that the Family and Medical Leave Act, which allows men and women to take job-
protected, unpaid family leave, was justified as remedial legislation because the states had 
“differential leave policies” for men and women “not attributable to any differential physical 
needs of men and women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for 
family members is women’s work”). 
 6. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2107 (2003) 
(explaining how managers have translated Title VII into a ban on any expression of sexuality 
in the workplace). 
 7. See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family 
Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit 
Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1320−21 (2008). 
 8. See, e.g., Susan Harthill, The Need for a Revitalized Regulatory Scheme to Address 
Workplace Bullying in the United States: Harnessing the Federal Occupational Safety and 
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family responsibilities, to allow all workers flexibility to manage their various life 
pursuits.9 On this view, policies originally intended for women would become 
universalized, changing dominant norms not just for women but for all workers. 
Some scholars envision universal protections as the end goal in the evolution of 
sexual harassment law and maternity leave to a “general civility code for the 
American workplace.”10 The European workplace is often held out as the ideal, 
with its more capacious concept of harassment (there referred to as “mobbing”) and 
more generous support for nonwork activities.  
These proposals are part of a larger trend—which I refer to as the “universal 
turn”—of expanding civil rights protections beyond rules that prohibit 
discrimination to rules of universal applicability.11 Antidiscrimination scholars 
                                                                                                                 
Health Act, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1250 (2010); David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying and 
American Employment Law: A Ten-Year Progress Report and Assessment, 32 COMP. LAB. L. 
& POL’Y J. 251 (2010); Brady Coleman, Shame, Rage and Freedom of Speech: Should the 
United States Adopt European “Mobbing” Laws?, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 53 (2006); 
William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. 
L. REV. 91 (2003); Catherine L. Fisk, Humiliation at Work, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
73 (2001); Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic 
Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1 (1999). 
 9. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between 
Public Law and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 
1108−09 (2010); Chai R. Feldblum, Policy Challenges and Opportunities for Workplace 
Flexibility: The State of Play, in WORK-LIFE POLICIES 251, 270 (Ann C. Crouter & Alan 
Booth eds., 2009); ARIANE HEGEWISCH & JANET C. GORNICK, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY 
RESEARCH, STATUTORY ROUTES TO WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY IN CROSS-NATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE (2008), available at http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/statutory-routes-to-
workplace-flexibility-in-cross-national-perspective-b258/at_download/file; Deborah L. 
Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834, 835 (2002); Mary Anne Case, How High 
the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care 
for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753 (2001); Katherine M. Franke, 
Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001); 
Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000). 
 10. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); see infra Parts 
I.A.3 & I.B.3. 
 11. For purposes of this Article, I define “universal rules” as the standards that result 
when civil rights laws are expanded beyond enumerated bases for prohibiting discrimination 
or requiring accommodation. The universal approach can be contrasted to the enumerative 
approach of protection on grounds such as sex, race, and sexual orientation, or the targeted 
approach of protecting or prohibiting certain forms of behavior due to links to discrimination 
or subordination on these enumerated grounds. I do not define universal rules simply as rules 
that apply equally to men and women. As discussed above, supra notes 4−5, many 
traditional antidiscrimination protections have always provided symmetrical protections to 
men and women. The universal turn goes further to provide a floor of protection regardless 
of discrimination. Nor do I refer to traditional labor standards (i.e., the minimum wage as 
opposed to equal pay) that do not find antecedents in antidiscrimination laws. I am interested 
specifically in the “turn” away from targeted protections toward universal ones, and whether 
it can fulfill antidiscrimination goals. I also note that advocates of universalizing rules may 
or may not prioritize antidiscrimination goals. Compare Yamada, supra note 8 (arguing for 
anti-bullying rules to ensure worker dignity), with Schultz, supra note 9 (arguing for reduced 
work hours to loosen the gendered division of labor).  
1222 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:1219 
 
have embraced universal approaches with lofty rhetoric. For example, Kenji 
Yoshino is sympathetic to judicial efforts to frame cases not as rights to equality, 
“but as cases touching on rights that, like a rising tide, will lift the boat of every 
person in America.”12 The shift to universal protection has two potential virtues. 
First, it accords with critical theories of identity in that it changes the focus from 
protected status characteristics to protected or prohibited activities. This is 
connected to the insights of antidiscrimination theorists that the new generation of 
sex discrimination is based not on the belief in women’s inferiority, but on 
gendered norms of behavior13 or stereotypes about family responsibilities for both 
women and men.14 Second, universalism seems to sidestep the equal versus special 
rights debate. Unlike projects perceived as redistributing resources based on group 
differences, universal policies may not have stigmatizing effects on members of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 192 (2006). 
Two cases representative of this shift are Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), in which 
the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law criminalizing sodomy not on the ground that it 
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, but rather on the ground that it violated the 
liberty interest in sexual intimacy, and Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), in which the 
Court recognized a constitutional claim when a courthouse was not wheelchair accessible, 
not on the ground that it discriminated on the basis of disability, but on the ground that it 
violated the universal right of access to courts. YOSHINO, supra, at 187−88; see also Kenji 
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 12 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749 (2011) (refining this 
argument to provisionally advocate a shift in equal protection jurisprudence by the Court 
towards acknowledgement of the “links between liberty and equality,” with an emphasis on 
liberty); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the 
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 21 (2008) (“Because the shared, universal 
nature of vulnerability draws the whole of society—not just a defined minority—under 
scrutiny, the vulnerability approach might be deemed a ‘post-identity’ analysis of what sort 
of protection society owes its members.”); Fisk, supra note 8, at 95 (“The development of a 
jurisprudence of workplace respect for all persons is the unfinished business of the project of 
feminist jurisprudence.”); Vicki Schultz & Allison Hoffman, The Need for a Reduced 
Workweek in the United States, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN AND THE NEW ECONOMY: THE 
CHALLENGE TO LEGAL NORMS 131, 133 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens eds., 2006) 
(arguing that the advantages of a shortened workweek demonstrate that “equality for women 
can best be achieved through universal measures that benefit all workers”). 
 13. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(en banc) (holding that the requirement that women, but not men, wear makeup at work was 
not impermissible sex stereotyping under Title VII); Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: 
Workplace Assimilation Demands and the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379, 396−97 
(2008). 
 14. See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 125 n.16 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (holding that because of “‘cognitive biases,’ which cause people to ignore or 
exclude information that is inconsistent with a stereotype . . . [e]ven a subtle reversal in 
evaluations [of an employee] that is consistent with stereotypical views about mothers, . . . 
(for example, that an employee no longer seems dedicated to her work, or is no longer able 
to work efficiently or complete her work in a timely fashion) suggests pretext [for 
discrimination]”); Enforcement Guidance, Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with 
Caregiving Responsibilities, No. 915.002, EEOC (May 23, 2007), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html. 
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disadvantaged group.15 Thus, universalism would seem to be the best route to 
undermining the gendered division of labor to give all people more meaningful 
choices in configuring work and life.16  
But is the universalist story of gradually expanding protection really one of 
progress? Will policies that embody universalist thinking avoid essentialist notions 
of identity and allow contestation of stereotypes? Will they avoid the destructive 
backlash and identity politics that sometimes result from civil rights rules? Or will 
the new universalism create new problems of inequality, by requiring all workers to 
assimilate to biased norms masquerading as neutral rules, and by diluting 
protections for those who need them most? This Article takes up these questions in 
two specific policy contexts: workplace anti-bullying rules and work-life 
accommodations. It contributes to the debate over universalism by arguing that 
these examples demonstrate a paradox: gender issues may point to larger problems 
with the structure of the workplace, but universal solutions may create new gender 
issues.  
Proponents of universalism seek to avoid “essentialism,” or entrenching certain 
fixed notions of gender and other aspects of identity in the law. To do so, 
universalists move away from equality-based justifications toward norms such as 
civility, dignity, liberty, and citizenship. Yet values like dignity could take on 
gendered dimensions, becoming tools of social conservatism or sexual repression,17 
and policies based on liberty risk reinforcing the fiction that workers are radically 
free to make choices, rather than constrained by a set of choices constructed by 
legal regimes, economic circumstances, and social expectations.18 For example, the 
focus on bullying may be a welcome departure from old stereotypes about female 
victims and male aggressors in sexual harassment cases, but it also opens 
opportunities for new scapegoats, such as the demanding female boss labeled a 
bully for defying traditional gender roles. And the shifting nomenclature from 
work-family to work-life does not necessarily correspond with any shifting social 
meaning. If only motherhood is culturally supported as an extracurricular activity, 
the transition in labels from “maternity leave” to “family leave” to “caretaker 
leave” to “work-life balance” reflects no more than a gesture toward political 
correctness. Even worse, work-life accommodations inevitably involve managers in 
making judgments about whose “life” is more worthy of accommodation, allowing 
enforcement of class, race, and gender biases. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. See NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS 25 (1997) (arguing that policy premised 
on group differences “tends to set in motion a . . . stigmatizing . . . recognition dynamic, 
which contradicts its official commitment to universalism”). 
 16. For an argument against the gendered division of labor, see Vicki Schultz, Feminism 
and Workplace Flexibility, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2010) (“When some people 
(historically, disproportionately women) find it difficult to participate meaningfully in paid 
work and other people (historically, disproportionately men) find it difficult to participate 
meaningfully in family life, basic principles of gender equality are violated.”). 
 17. See infra notes 228–29 and accompanying text. 
 18. Cf. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1419 (2004) (arguing that the “orientation-blindness” of the same-sex 
marriage as private liberty project masks its core heteronormativity: homosexual 
relationships are recognized only to the extent they mimic heterosexual relationships).  
1224 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:1219 
 
Universal solutions are also thought to avoid backlash, in other words, the 
counterproductive effects of identity politics, including stigmatization of the 
identity group seeking recognition and polarization of discussion that undermines 
efforts to transform institutions to achieve inclusivity. Backlash is dangerous in 
terms of equality because it may transfer the costs of the new policy to the 
disadvantaged group. But enacting more expansive workplace rules may not diffuse 
the backlash, particularly if the new rules are individualistic policies that pit the 
interests of certain workers against others—for example, “bullies” versus 
“victims,” or workers who want time off for volunteering versus parents who want 
time off for caretaking. 
Universal policies may also have disadvantages in terms of worsening the 
gendered division of labor. I refer to these disadvantages as the risks of 
“assimilation” and “dilution.” As feminist legal theorists have long argued, 
universal protections may only or primarily assist workers who assimilate to 
dominant norms tailored to “model” workers who are typically young, married, 
white, heterosexual, affluent, and male.19 For example, flexible work arrangements 
may be most helpful to married men who use the advantages of flexibility to 
engage in more paid labor rather than housework.20 Women are more likely to have 
caretaking duties, and therefore to be unable to assimilate to this model. Notions of 
race, class, gender, and sexuality will also play into whether a court recognizes an 
indignity as bullying.  
Assimilation is a risk not just for individuals but also for equality-based social 
movements. If the focus of harassment law shifts from discrimination to dignity, 
we may lose sight of how harassment can be part of a project of maintaining the 
workplace as a site of male privilege. Feminist movements might be assimilated 
into broader movements for workers’ rights. Universalizing projects lend credence 
to the zeitgeist of “post-gender idealism.”21 The race between Barack Obama and 
Hillary Clinton for the 2008 Democratic nomination for president caused many to 
ask whether the United States has moved beyond equality.22 Yet discrimination has 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. See Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of 
Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 267 (1989) (maintaining that “rights and rules that are 
universally formulated and thus blind to differences of race, culture, gender, age, or 
disability, perpetuate rather than undermine oppression”). 
 20. See infra note 378–80 and accompanying text. 
 21. Courtney E. Martin, Transcending 9 to 5: How American Women and Men Are 
Reworking Our Country, in THE SHRIVER REPORT: A WOMAN’S NATION CHANGES 
EVERYTHING 383, 387 (Heather Boushey & Ann O’Leary eds., 2009), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/10/pdf/awn/a_womans_nation.pdf [herinafter 
THE SHRIVER REPORT]. 
 22. See ANNE E. KORNBLUT, NOTES FROM THE CRACKED CEILING: HILLARY CLINTON, 
SARAH PALIN, AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE FOR A WOMAN TO WIN 82 (2009) (describing 
“postfeminist[]” voters); Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1599 (2009) 
(arguing that an Obama-era ideology of “post-racialism . . . [does] the ideological work of 
colorblindness without so much of its retro-regressive baggage”); john a. powell, Post-
Racialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 785, 789 (2009) (“To post-
racialists, white Americans’ support of President Obama is proof positive that we are in, or 
rapidly approaching, a new, post-racial era.”). 
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not disappeared;23 rather, it has morphed into new forms including implicit bias,24 
institutional patterns of exclusion,25 and subtle demands to conform.26  
Another problem is dilution: universalized rules may dilute civil rights 
protections by reducing the resources available to protect those most 
disadvantaged. The result of gender-neutral universalism may not be a norm that 
works for everyone. Rather, universal policies risk diluting protections by failing to 
go far enough to level the playing field for disadvantaged groups. Additionally, a 
universal turn in harassment law and leave policy risks trivializing the harms of 
discrimination. Due to scarce resources, if employers must expand their harassment 
and leave policies to address a broader array of circumstances, they may be less 
able to implement and enforce generous protections.  
As a general theoretical matter, those concerned about discrimination should 
approach the universal turn with caution. The problems of workplace inequality 
cannot be resolved in a few broad strokes without attention to hierarchies built on 
axes of identity. Prohibited bases for discrimination, like race, gender, and sexual 
orientation, should be enumerated. Battles for political recognition must be fought, 
and difficult economic choices must be made. I recommend that goals be reframed 
in terms of increasing inclusiveness, rather than achieving absolute equality or 
universality. Inclusiveness would require constant reconsideration of how legal 
rules and workplace structures exclude certain workers. While this analysis is 
developed in the context of workplace reform projects designed to reduce sex 
discrimination, it is also pertinent to other debates over expanding the meaning of 
civil rights rules.27  
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. Female workers earn only seventy-seven cents per dollar earned by male workers. 
Heather Boushey, The New Breadwinners, in THE SHRIVER REPORT, supra note 21, at 31, 32. 
Even in the same occupations, women with substantially similar resumes and backgrounds 
earn five percent less than men in the first year out of college. Id. at 59. 
 24. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 969, 982 (2006). 
 25. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460−69 (2001) (contrasting “patterns of 
interaction among groups within the workplace that, over time, exclude nondominant 
groups” with “deliberate exclusion or subordination based on race or gender”). 
 26. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
1259, 1262 (2000) (arguing that members of outsider groups “are often likely to perceive 
themselves as subject to negative stereotypes,” and therefore “likely to feel the need to do 
significant amounts of ‘extra’ identity work to counter those stereotypes”); Kenji Yoshino, 
Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002) (discussing “covering” as a form of discrimination 
resulting from explicit or implicit pressure to downplay identity). 
 27. For other debates over universal solutions to problems of inequality, see, for 
example, Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution 
Reform and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1694−99 (2010) 
(critiquing the focus on “sex trafficking” rather than “human trafficking”); Julie C. Suk, 
Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment Opportunity in 
Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73 (2007) (arguing that a universal rule only allowing 
terminations of employees “for cause” would not protect minorities better than 
antidiscrimination law).  
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I sketches out the case for expansion of 
sexual harassment law and leave policy. Part II identifies and describes the 
“universal turn” in antidiscrimination theory and proposes a set of questions for 
assessing universalizing policy initiatives from an antidiscrimination perspective. 
Part III addresses these questions by analyzing reform projects aimed at taking the 
“sexual” out of harassment law and the “family” out of leave policy, drawing on 
social science and comparative legal research. It concludes that without attention to 
gender, universal proposals are likely to result in increased inequality. Part IV 
concludes that reformers should focus on the more modest goal of increasing 
inclusiveness, rather than universalism, and suggests ways that law can move 
beyond gender while still maintaining attention to gender discrimination. Rather 
than addressing universal harms with civil rights laws, this Part suggests more 
flexible and cautious approaches to resolving universal problems. 
I. BEYOND SEX, GENDER, AND FAMILY 
This Part summarizes the criticisms of the targeted approach to harassment law 
and leave policy. It explains the limitations of sexual harassment and family leave 
doctrines that have led to calls for universalized protections in the forms of anti-
bullying laws and work-life accommodations.  
A. Expanding Sexual Harassment 
1. Extending Sexual Harassment Law from Women to Men 
In the 1970s, feminist lawyers and activists such as Catharine MacKinnon 
popularized the concept of sexual harassment, arguing successfully that it was a 
form of discrimination “because of . . . sex” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.28 MacKinnon theorized that sexual harassment is the convergence of 
“men’s control over women’s sexuality and capital’s control over employees’ work 
lives.”29 But in the first federal appellate case to recognize sexual harassment as a 
form of discrimination, the D.C. Circuit held that the doctrine applied to “a male 
subordinate” harassed “by a heterosexual female superior,” or “a subordinate of 
either gender” harassed “by a homosexual superior of the same gender.”30 In the 
1998 decision, Oncale v. Sundowner, the Supreme Court held that harassment by 
an aggressor of the same gender as the plaintiff would violate Title VII “if there 
were credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual.”31  
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (creating a cause of action for discrimination 
“because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”). 
 29. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF 
SEX DISCRIMINATION 174−75 (1979). 
 30. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
 31. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). The Court also 
held that a plaintiff could prove harassment by showing that the harasser was motivated by 
general hostility to the presence of one gender in the workplace, or with evidence about how 
the harasser treated members of the other sex. Id. at 80–81. 
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2. Problems with Sexual Harassment Law 
Even in its new gender-neutral form, sexual harassment law has been criticized as 
too narrowly focused on sex. First, the doctrine fails to cover many types of 
harassment claims. Second, because most sexual harassment plaintiffs are women, 
women are stigmatized as potential plaintiffs, and they may face discrimination in 
hiring and job opportunities as a result of employers’ fears that they may bring costly 
suits. Third, the doctrine has shifted away from preventing gender discrimination and 
toward preventing any expression of sexuality in the workplace.  
a. Underinclusivity 
Sexual harassment law is substantially limited in its ability to target harassment at 
work and gender inequality. Feminists argue that sexual harassment law is 
underinclusive as a result of the legal fixation with formal equality, or avoiding any 
classifications based on sex. For example, the following fact patterns have sometimes 
evaded the “because of . . . sex” requirement of Title VII32: 
The Equal Opportunity or Bisexual Harasser. Some courts have held that a 
harasser who uses sexual conduct to demean both men and women is not engaged in 
discrimination.33 If, for example, a harasser touches both men and women in offensive 
ways, but the men are subjected to worse treatment, that is, the harasser touches men’s 
genitals but not women’s, the men would have a cause of action, while the women 
might not.34  
“Real Men.” Where men harass other men for failing to meet masculine gender 
norms, some courts have held that the harassment is not “because of sex” but rather 
“because of sexual orientation”—a category not covered under Title VII.35 The same 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. These examples are elaborations on those described in Ann McGinley’s helpful study. 
See Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment “Because of 
Sex,” 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1154−58 (2008). 
 33. Id. at 1155−56; Ronald Turner, Title VII and the Inequality-Enhancing Effects of the 
Bisexual and Equal Opportunity Harasser Defenses, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 341 (2005); see 
also Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 402−04 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[B]ecause Title VII is premised 
on eliminating discrimination, inappropriate conduct that is inflicted on both sexes, or is inflicted 
regardless of sex, is outside the statute’s ambit.” (emphasis in original)). But see Steiner v. 
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the equal opportunity 
harasser argument in dicta). 
 34. Cf. Breitenfeldt v. Long Prairie Packing Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176 (D. Minn. 
1999) (concluding that a man who was subjected to sexual assault was harassed because of sex, 
by contrast to women who suffered “inappropriate touching” in a less offensive degree). But see 
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011) (describing 
harassment cases that examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether harassment 
was discriminatory). 
 35. McGinley, supra note 32, at 1156−57; see also, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 
F.3d 757, 763−65 (6th Cir. 2006). But see Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that harassment for failure to conform to a male stereotype is 
discrimination “because of sex”); Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(similar). Over the years, there have been several attempts to plug the gaps in the statute by 
adding orientation and gender identity to Title VII as prohibited bases for discrimination. See Jill 
D. Weinberg, Gender Nonconformity: An Analysis of Perceived Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity Protection Under the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 8−13 
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goes for transsexual identity.36 
Hazing and Horseplay. Where men haze male newcomers or engage in 
“horseplay” with established male workers, courts conclude it is not discrimination 
because the harassers are not motivated by homosexual desire or anti-male 
animosity.37  
Gatekeeping. Where men harass women “to maintain work—particularly the 
more highly rewarded lines of work—as bastions of masculine competence and 
authority,”38 but not out of sexual desire or in a sexual manner, plaintiffs typically 
lose.39 For example, women subjected to unfavorable treatment due to sexist 
attitudes about their inferiority may not prevail on sexual harassment claims if they 
were not subjected to sexualized conduct.40 As a general matter, it is difficult to 
prove that harassment without sexual advances was “because of sex.”41 
b. Stigmatizing Women as Victims 
A second criticism is that sexual harassment law may have perverse economic 
effects that hinder women’s workplace equality. This results from the fact that 
women are the primary plaintiffs in sexual harassment suits. Despite the doctrinal 
expansion, in 2008 men only filed approximately 16 percent of sexual harassment 
charges.42 Because women are more likely to bring suit, sexual harassment law 
could create disincentives for firms to hire women.43 Hiring discrimination cases 
                                                                                                                 
(2009) (providing a history). 
 36. Compare Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084−85 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(concluding that Title VII only makes it unlawful to “discriminate against women because they 
are women and against men because they are men,” not transsexuals because they are 
transsexuals), with Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Sex stereotyping 
based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, 
irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex 
discrimination claim where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender 
non-conformity.”).  
 37. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 
519−23 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 38. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1687 
(1998). 
 39. Clare Diefenbach, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment After Oncale: Meeting the 
“Because of . . . Sex” Requirement, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 42, 74, 94−96 (2007) 
(surveying post-Oncale cases between 1998 and 2006). 
 40. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 38, at 1734−35 (discussing Ramsey v. City of Denver, 
907 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
 41. Id. at 1686−87. 
 42. Sexual Harassment Charges: EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997–FY 2010, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ 
sexual_harassment.cfm.  
 43. See Jessica Fink, Unintended Consequences: How Antidiscrimination Litigation 
Increases Group Bias in Employer-Defendants, 38 N.M. L. REV. 333, 345 (2008); Paul Oyer 
& Scott Schaefer, Sorting, Quotas, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Who Hires When It’s 
Hard to Fire?, 45 J.L. & ECON. 41, 46 (2002); Suk, supra note 27, at 83−84. See generally 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992). 
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are very difficult to prove.44 And paradoxically, sexual harassment law may 
discourage gender integration. In law firms, for example, some men in positions of 
authority are resistant to mentoring women, or choosing them for privileged work 
that requires closed-door meetings, late-night hours, or travel, for fear of 
accusations of sexual harassment.45 
c. Fixation with Sex 
A third problem is that “sexual” harassment law has been interpreted as barring 
sexual expression (rather than discriminatory harassment), leading to punishment 
of even benign expressions of sexual desire and suppression of unconventional 
sexuality. Based on her study of employer policies, Vicki Schultz has concluded 
that employers have translated sexual harassment doctrine into overly prohibitive 
policies, creating a desexualized, sanitized, and dehumanized workplace.46 In a 
similar vein, Janet Halley has argued that Oncale has the potential to turn Title VII 
into a tool of homophobic panic.47 She fears that Title VII could be used by 
purported “victims” of benign, but unwanted, same-sex sexual overtures in the 
workplace to oppress gay men or lesbians.48  
3. Universal Protection Through Anti-Bullying Law 
To address these problems, the grounds for a harassment claim have been 
gradually expanding beyond sex, race, color, religion, or national origin.49 Every 
new prohibited basis for discrimination is also a prohibited basis for harassment. 
Federal laws prohibit discrimination based on pregnancy,50 genetic information,51 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 275 (2000). 
 45. HOLLY ENGLISH, GENDER ON TRIAL: SEXUAL STEREOTYPES AND WORK/LIFE 
BALANCE IN THE LEGAL WORKPLACE 65−70 (2003); see also Sari Bashi & Maryana Iskander, 
Why Legal Education Is Failing Women, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 389 (2006). 
 46. Schultz, supra note 6, at 2131 (describing an “avalanche of no-dating policies and love 
contracts, zero-tolerance policies, self-policing, and discipline for conduct with sexual overtones”). 
 47. Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
182, 195 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).  
 48. Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 80, 80–81 
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). Marc Spindelman responds that Halley cites no 
reported decision evidencing that courts have indulged any such homophobic plaintiffs. 
Marc Spindelman, Discriminating Pleasures, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
201, 204 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004). Although Halley’s fears 
have yet to play out on the pages of the federal reporters, research supports the view that 
same-sex sexual overtures toward men are more likely to be perceived as harassment than 
opposite-sex overtures toward men. See Margaret S. Stockdale, Cynthia Gandolfo Berry, 
Robert W. Schneider & Feng Cao, Perceptions of the Sexual Harassment of Men, 5 
PSYCHOL. MEN & MASCULINITY 158, 165 (2004).  
 49. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) 
(enumerating sex, race, color, religion, and national origin discrimination as grounds for a 
Title VII claim).  
 50. Id. § 2000e(k). 
 51. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
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age,52 disability,53 and union affiliation.54 Some state and local laws expand 
prohibited bases for discrimination further, to appearance,55 sexual orientation, 
gender identity, marital status, and victims of domestic violence,56 to name a few.57 
Moreover, Title VII and other laws prohibit harassment in retaliation against an 
employee for claiming discrimination—a cause of action valid regardless of 
whether the plaintiff prevails on the underlying claim.58 The elements of these 
harassment causes of action generally track those of a sexual harassment claim. 
This patchwork of harassment prohibitions is gradually expanding toward a general 
harassment ban that would take the “sexual” out of harassment law. The creeping 
expansion of sexual harassment doctrine is accompanied by a shifting 
understanding of the primary problem with harassment. The harm of harassment is 
increasingly understood to be its affront to a worker’s dignity or health, not 
necessarily that harassment contributes to inequality.  
However, Title VII provides no remedy for abusive working conditions, no 
matter how extreme, where the abuse is not discriminatory. Not only is there no 
“general civility code”59 for the American workplace, but there is no cause of 
action whatsoever for most workers who are subjected to nondiscriminatory 
abuse.60 As a result, many scholars now call for universal protections against 
harassment.61 These scholars are divided on whether new statutory remedies or 
labor law and traditional tort remedies, such as the cause of action for intentional 
                                                                                                                 
881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 52. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006). 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(4) (2006). 
 54. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006). 
 55. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 
1081−90 (2009). 
 56. See, e.g., Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290–301 (McKinney 2005). 
 57. Many corporations prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or gender expression. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., CORPORATE 
EQUALITY INDEX 2010: A REPORT CARD ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER 
EQUALITY IN CORPORATE AMERICA 8, 10−11 (2009), available at 
http://www.hrc.org/documents/HRC_Corporate_Equality_Index_2010.pdf. 
 58. See, e.g., Rhonda Reaves, Retaliatory Harassment: Sex and the Hostile Coworker as 
the Enforcer of Workplace Norms, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 403, 417–20.  
 59. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 60. See Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil 
Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2127−39 (2007) (concluding that the 
majority of jurisdictions hold that hostile work environments are not sufficiently 
“outrageous” to qualify as intentional infliction of emotional distress); David C. Yamada, 
Crafting a Legislative Response to Workplace Bullying, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 475, 
496–97 (2004) [hereinafter Yamada, Crafting] (explaining that only a small number of 
employers have written prohibitions on bullying that could possibly create a contractual 
obligation); David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and the Need for 
Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 521−22 (2000) 
[hereinafter Yamada, Phenomenon] (concluding that the regulatory framework established 
by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 to avoid “serious physical harm” to 
workers is too focused on physical workplace hazards to address harassment). 
 61. See supra note 8.  
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infliction of emotional distress,62 can provide redress to victims or change 
prevailing norms.63  
The U.S. approach of prohibiting only discriminatory workplace harassment 
stands in contrast to the universal approach of many other countries.64 Around the 
same time that MacKinnon popularized the concept of sexual harassment in the 
United States in the 1980s, German psychologist Dr. Heinz Leymann popularized 
the concept of workplace bullying as a political issue in Europe.65 Leymann 
described the phenomenon as “mobbing” or “psychological terror,”66 and he 
studied post-traumatic stress disorder in victims.67 A substantial body of empirical 
research now documents the effects of workplace bullying, which include harms to 
the physical, psychological, and economic well-being of workers and increased 
costs for employers.68 A number of European countries specifically regulate 
workplace bullying, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England, Finland, 
France, the Netherlands, and Sweden.69 Closer to home, Quebec’s labour code was 
amended in 2004 to ban “psychological harassment,” defined as “vexatious 
behaviour in the form of repeated and hostile or unwanted conduct . . . that affects 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. See Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 799 (Ind. 2008) (commenting that 
workplace bullying could be a form of intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
 63. Compare Yamada, Crafting, supra note 60 (advocating legislative solutions), and 
Harthill, supra note 8, at 1305–06 (advocating regulatory measures), with Ehrenreich, supra 
note 8, at 22 (advocating common law remedies), and Corbett, supra note 8 (same).  
 64. See Gabrielle S. Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The European Transformation of 
Harassment Law: Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241 (2003). 
 65. Heinz Leymann, Some Historical Notes: Research and the Term Mobbing, THE 
MOBBING ENCYCLOPAEDIA, http://www.leymann.se/English/11120E.HTM. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Heinz Leymann, How Serious Are Psychological Problems After Mobbing?, THE 
MOBBING ENCYCLOPAEDIA, http://www.leymann.se/English/32100E.HTM. 
 68. See Susan Harthill, Bullying in the Workplace: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 
17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 247, 258–60 (2008); Loraleigh Keashly & Joel H. Neuman, Bullying in 
the Workplace: Its Impact and Management, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 335 (2004). The 
phenomenon has also spawned a cottage industry of popular nonfiction books. See 
Workplace Bullying Institute, Workplace Bullying-Related Books, 
WORKPLACEBULLYING.ORG, http://www.workplacebullying.org/research/suggested-
readings.html (collecting twenty titles on the topic). Lest you think it not serious, the 
research shows that bullying by pilots has caused fatal plane crashes. E.g., Carl H. Lavin, 
When Moods Affect Safety: Communication in a Cockpit Means a Lot a Few Miles Up, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 1994, at E18 (describing two plane crashes resulting after bullied crew 
members became fearful and failed to challenge pilots’ decisions). Bullying by doctors has 
resulted in patient deaths. E.g., Lisa Rosetta, Abuse Protection Sought for Health Care 
Workers, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 21, 2009 (describing a case in which nurses failed to follow 
up on a mother’s complaints that her toddler was dehydrated because they were afraid of 
retribution from a bullying doctor who had told them the toddler was fine, leading to the 
child’s death).  
 69. For a summary, see Frank Lorho & Ulrich Hilp, Bullying at Work 15–23 (European 
Parliament Directorate-Gen. for Research, Working Paper SOCI 108 EN, 2001), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/workingpapers/soci/pdf/108_en.pdf. 
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an employee’s dignity or psychological or physical integrity and that results in a 
harmful work environment for the employee.”70 
In the United States, anti-bullying bills have been introduced in twenty state 
legislatures, including New York and California.71 All of the statutory proposals are 
based on model anti-bullying legislation termed the “Healthy Workplace Act.”72 
The model act defines actionable conduct more narrowly than other countries’ 
statutes, as “conduct that a reasonable person would find hostile, offensive, and 
unrelated to an employer’s legitimate business interests.”73 It specifies that 
“severity, nature, and frequency” are relevant to determining whether conduct is 
abusive.74 A cause of action would look much like a harassment case under Title 
VII, minus the discrimination, and plus the mental state of “malice.”75  
Although the law on the books prohibits only status-based harassment, in 
practice, U.S. employers have begun implementing broader harassment bans in the 
workplace. Even without formal legislation, the global trend toward anti-bullying 
rules has affected the conduct of U.S. employers.76 Global employers, faced with 
different rules in different jurisdictions, have incentives to adopt the most 
restrictive rules and enforce anti-bullying policies at U.S. as well as European 
worksites.77 Some U.S. companies have already added bullying to the list of 
prohibited practices, along with status-based harassment.78 Unions have begun to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. Act Respecting Labour Standards, R.S.Q. 2002, c. N-1.1, ch. IV, div. V.2, § 81.18 
¶ 1 (Que., Can.), http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/laws/stat/rsq-c-n-1.1/84271/rsq-c-n-1.1. 
html#history. Saskatchewan amended its Occupational Health and Safety Act to bar 
psychological harassment in 2007. Occupational Health and Safety (Harassment Prevention) 
Amendment Act of 2007, S.S. 66 (Can.). 
 71. See The Healthy Workplace Campaign, HEALTHY WORKPLACE BILL (Feb. 28, 2011), 
http://www.healthyworkplacebill.org/states.php. 
 72. Id. The New York and California bills follow the Healthy Workplace Act in 
pertinent part. 
 73. Yamada, Crafting, supra note 60, at 517–21. 
 74. Id. at 518. 
 75. Id. at 518–20. 
 76. The Federal Bureau of Investigation advises employers to adopt workplace violence 
prevention programs that consider “[h]omicide and other physical assaults . . . on a continuum that 
also include[s] domestic violence, stalking, threats, harassment, bullying, emotional abuse, 
intimidation, and other forms of conduct that create anxiety, fear, and a climate of distrust in the 
workplace.” FBI NAT’L CTR. FOR THE ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT CRIME, WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES 
IN RESPONSE 13 (Eugene A. Rugala & Arnold R. Isaacs eds., 2004). 
 77. Tresa Baldas, No Matter Where the Employees Are, Make Sure the Rules Are the 
SAME, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 7, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp 
?id=1202437433481&No_Matter_Where_the_Employees_Are_Make_Sure_the_Rules_Are
_the_emSAMEem. 
 78. See NOA DAVENPORT, RUTH DISTLER SCHWARTZ & GAIL PURSELL ELLIOTT, 
MOBBING: EMOTIONAL ABUSE IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 148–53 (3d prtg. 2005) 
(describing anti-mobbing policies at Levi Strauss & Co. and Saturn Corp.); Cari Tuna, 
Lawyers and Employers Take the Fight to “Workplace Bullies,” WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2008, 
at B6 (reporting that in June 2008, Graniterock, a Watsonville, California distributor of 
construction materials, “added nondiscriminatory bullying to its list of prohibited conduct in 
the workplace, which already included harassment based on gender, ethnicity and other 
protected statuses”); STATE OF OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, ANTI-MOBBING POLICY, NO. 
50.110 (Feb. 12, 2001), available at http://www.deq.state.or.us/msd/budget/0709GRB/ 
13_SpecialReports/AffirmativeActionPlan2005-07.pdf. 
2011] BEYOND EQUALITY 1233 
 
add protections against workplace bullying to collective bargaining agreements.79 
B. Expanding Family Leave 
1. Extending Leave Policy from Mothers to Parents 
Just as sexual harassment doctrine began as a means to eradicate women’s 
workplace subordination, feminists argued for maternity leave as a remedy for 
women’s exclusion from the workplace.80 By 1991, fifteen states were providing 
women up to one year of extended maternity leave, while only four provided men 
with the same.81 In 1993, Congress passed the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 
allowing both men and women to take job-protected, unpaid leave for childbirth or 
adoption, or for an employee’s “serious health condition,” or that of the employee’s 
spouse, parents, or children.82 Parents include “those with day-to-day 
responsibilities to care for and financially support a child.”83 In 2003, in Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Supreme Court affirmed that the 
FMLA was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as a remedy for the states’ “differential leave policies” for men and 
women.84 Those differential leave policies violated the equal protection clause 
because they “were not attributable to any differential physical needs of men and 
women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family 
members is women’s work.”85 Thus, the Court affirmed Congress’s requirement 
that leave policy be formally gender neutral.  
2. Problems with Family Leave Policy 
Even in its new gender-neutral form, family leave policy, like sexual harassment 
law, has been criticized as misdirected. First, the statute is under-inclusive: it gives 
no help to most workers. Second, because most leave takers are women, women are 
stigmatized as less-able workers, resulting in discrimination. Third, the doctrine has 
shifted away from helping women achieve parity in labor markets and toward 
protecting traditional families.  
a. Underinclusivity 
The FMLA is limited in its ability to address inflexible work and gender 
inequality. Its coverage has the following shortcomings: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. See Yamada, supra note 8, at 271. 
 80. See Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal 
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 513, 522 (1983). 
 81. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003). 
 82. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006). 
 83. 29 C.F.R. § 825.122(c)(3) (2009). 
 84. 538 U.S. at 726–27, 731. 
 85. Id. at 731. 
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Low-Income Workers. Because of the statute’s limitations on worker eligibility, 
forty-six percent of the workforce is not protected by the FMLA.86 Even for 
covered workers, the FMLA stops short of ensuring paid leave.87 The result: low-
income workers are unlikely to be protected.88 
Single Parents. Although only half of U.S. households conform to the traditional 
married-couple model,89 unpaid leave is of little use to employees without a 
breadwinning partner to provide support during the period of leave.90 This places 
African American and Latino/a families, which are more likely to have a single 
parent, and women, who are more likely to head single-parent families, at a 
disproportionate disadvantage.91  
Routine Caregiving. Many of the potential caregiving responsibilities that may 
interfere with work fall short of a “serious health condition.”92 For example, if a 
daycare shut down because some children were sick, only the parents of the sick 
children would be covered by the FMLA, while the parents of the children 
unaffected by the outbreak would be without daycare but uncovered.93 The FMLA 
does not help parents who need time to participate meaningfully in their children’s 
lives when they are healthy. Proposed legislation would give parents time off for 
school activities, like parent-teacher conferences.94 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department of Labor’s 
Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 35550, 35622 (Dep’t of Labor June 28, 2007). The 
FMLA applies only to workplaces with fifty or more employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i). 
The employee must have been on the job for at least a year and have worked at least 1250 
hours during the year before the leave. Id. § 2611(2)(A). 
 87. California, Washington, New Jersey, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. now 
mandate some form of paid leave, whether financed by employers or through payroll taxes 
on all workers. Feldblum, supra note 9, at 257–59. 
 88. See Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Lifting the Floor: Sex, Class, and Education, 39 
U. BALT. L.F. 57, 62 (2009); Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income 
Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2007); Michael Selmi & Naomi Cahn, Women 
in the Workplace: Which Women, Which Agenda?, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7, 16 
(2006). 
 89. JASON FIELDS & LYNNE M. CASPER, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING 
ARRANGEMENTS: 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU REP. P20-537, at 3 fig.1 (2001), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-537.pdf (showing that as of the year 2000, 
47.2% of households were not married couples).  
 90. See Wen-Jui Han, Christopher Ruhm & Jane Waldfogel, Parental Leave Policies 
and Parents’ Employment and Leave-Taking, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 29, 50 (2009) 
(finding “evidence of stronger effects [of leave legislation] for married than single mothers, 
as expected, because married women are more likely to be eligible under the laws and able 
to afford a period of unpaid leave”). 
 91. See Nancy E. Dowd, Race, Gender, and Work/Family Policy, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 219, 245 (2004). 
 92. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Is the Work-Family Conflict Pathological or Normal Under 
the FMLA? The Potential of the FMLA to Cover Ordinary Work-Family Conflicts, 15 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 193, 196 (2004) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (2000)).  
 93. Id. at 216.  
 94. Family and Medical Leave Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 824, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
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Nonparent and Nonspouse Caregivers. “While the FMLA is quite liberal in 
defining the parent/child relationship, its view of caregiving is crabbed and 
unrealistically focused on parenthood as the locus of caregiving.”95 The FMLA 
provides for leave to care for spouses but not domestic partners.96 Siblings and 
other relatives are not covered. Although many communities are built on ties 
outside kinship,97 an employee who wishes to take leave to care for a sick friend or 
relative who is not a parent, spouse, or child cannot do so under the FMLA.98  
b. Stigmatizing Women as Less-Able Workers 
A second problem is that because women are the primary beneficiaries of family 
leave policy, they are stigmatized as less-able workers. Although the FMLA is 
gender neutral, women are more likely than men to take leave.99 As a result, 
employers may engage in hiring discrimination against women.100 Some scholars 
have concluded that the FMLA has exacerbated discrimination against women, to 
the extent it has had any effect at all.101 Women, but not men, are penalized in labor 
                                                                                                                 
 
 95. Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of 
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 408 (2008). 
 96. See Kimberly Menashe Glassman, Balancing the Demands of the Workplace with 
the Needs of the Modern Family: Expanding Family and Medical Leave to Protect Domestic 
Partners, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 837 (2004); Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 97. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 269 (1995) (“Blood 
ties have not held the preeminent position in Black families that they have held in white 
families.”). 
 98. See Ethan J. Leib, Friendship and the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 697 (2007); 
Murray, supra note 95, at 408 (“The Act is oblivious to caregivers who provide care, but 
otherwise do not cohere with normative understandings of parenthood.”); Laura A. 
Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 204 (2007); see also Rachel F. 
Moran, How Second-Wave Feminism Forgot the Single Woman, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 223, 
288–92 (2004). But see Dep’t of Labor, Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-3 (June 22, 
2010) (defining “son or daughter” under section 101(12) of the FMLA to give rights to those 
who care for children regardless of the legal or biological relationship). 
 99. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIV., THE 2000 SURVEY REPORT app. A-2, 
tbls.A2-2.4, 2.6 (2001), http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/APPX-A-2-TABLES.htm. 
 100. Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 745–
50 (2000); see also Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. 
REV. 25, 32 (1998) (“As long as parental leave is de facto maternity leave there 
will be wide spread, but often difficult to prove, discrimination against women in the 
workplace.”).  
 101. See Jean Kimmel & Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, The Effects of Family Leave on 
Wages, Employment, and the Family Wage Gap: Distributional Implications, 15 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 115, 139 (2004) (finding “a strong negative effect of mandated family leave on 
employment, implying that gender discrimination has resulted from a federally mandated 
benefit that employers fear will increase costs”); Michael Selmi, Is Something Better Than 
Nothing? Critical Reflections on Ten Years of the FMLA, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 65, 71 
(2004). But see Catherine Albiston, Institutional Perspectives on Law, Work, and Family, 3 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 404 & n.2 (2007) (concluding that empirical research 
suggests unpaid leave legislation had little to no negative effect on women’s wages as a 
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markets for being parents.102 Courts are beginning to recognize family 
responsibilities discrimination as a civil rights violation.103 However, courts have 
not gone so far as to hold that employers must accommodate employees’ family 
responsibilities. 
c. Fixation with Family 
A third problem is that leave policy is too focused on the family to the exclusion 
of other valuable life pursuits.104 Katherine Franke extends the feminist critique of 
compulsory heterosexuality to critique compulsory motherhood, which she terms 
“repronormativity.”105 Franke questions the claim that mothering “is social 
production worthy of substantial public support,” by pointing out that biological 
reproduction “is by no means the only manner in which social reproduction takes 
place, nor is it necessarily the most important.”106 Mary Ann Case gives the 
example: “what if a poor woman wants to write a book or start a business or get an 
                                                                                                                 
whole, although individual workers who take leave are penalized). 
 102. See, e.g., ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST 
IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED (2001); Michelle J. Budig & 
Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 204 (2001); Jane 
Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on Women’s Wages, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 209 (1997); Jane 
Waldfogel, Understanding the “Family Gap” in Pay for Women with Children, 12 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 137 (1998); see also Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is 
There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 1332 (2007) (discussing how, in two 
experiments, one in which undergraduates evaluated fictitious job applications varying in 
gender and parental status, and one in which employers were sent resumes for fictitious job 
candidates varying only in gender and parental status, mothers were disadvantaged compared 
to women without children, while fathers were advantaged over men without children). 
 103. See Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2009); Back v. Hastings on 
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004). The Center for Work Life Law 
at UC Hastings Law School has documented a four hundred percent increase in the number 
of cases brought under the rubric of family responsibilities discrimination in recent decades. 
MARY C. STILL, LITIGATING THE MATERNAL WALL: U.S. LAWSUITS CHARGING 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WORKERS WITH FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 2 (July 6, 2006), 
available at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/FRDreport.pdf. 
 104. Kathleen Silbaugh has observed that in some recent FMLA cases, courts have given 
the term “serious health condition” an expansive interpretation, allowing parents time off to 
care for routine childhood illnesses. Silbaugh, supra note 92, at 204. Silbaugh suggests that 
these cases show the judiciary has begun to internalize shifting cultural norms toward 
recognition of ordinary work-family dilemmas and accommodation of workers’ caregiving 
responsibilities. Id. at 214–15. She analogizes this trend to acceptance of sexual harassment 
by a conservative judiciary eager to impose civility norms on the workplace by quashing 
sexual expression. Id. Silbaugh concludes that “[w]hile a decency-based norm of family time 
need not be as problematic as a decency based norm against sexual expression,” feminists 
must remain vigilant to ensure that work-family policy is accompanied by a focus on 
equality. Id. at 215. 
 105. Franke, supra note 9, at 183. 
 106. Id. at 188–89. Population replacement can be accomplished through immigration 
policy. Id. at 192–95; Case, supra note 9, at 1773–74. Arguments to the contrary are often 
tinged with racism or xenophobia. Franke, supra note 9, at 192–95. 
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advanced degree instead of raising a(nother) child?”107 Policies that privilege the 
family may be built on the assumption that the life pursuits of those who opt out of 
traditional family arrangements are less important or meaningful.108  
3. Universal Protection Through Work-Life Policy 
To address these problems, family leave policy, like harassment law, has been 
undergoing gradual expansion. In 2007, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) issued an enforcement guidance on the topic of “caregiving 
responsibilities” that observes that such responsibilities are not limited to childcare, 
but also encompass eldercare and caring for individuals with disabilities.109 Nine 
states and the District of Columbia have now expanded on the FMLA’s definition 
of family to include nontraditional family members, such as domestic partners or 
parents-in-law.110 In 2008, the FMLA was amended to allow “next of kin” to take 
twenty-six weeks of leave during a twelve-month period to care for a wounded 
military service member.111 Many states have laws requiring leave or giving 
employers incentives to provide leave for organ, blood, or bone-marrow donors, 
emergency or disaster volunteers, victims of crimes, victims of domestic violence, 
witnesses in legal proceedings, those on jury duty, and voters.112 One handbook of 
employee benefits lists the following types of leave: pregnancy, post-pregnancy, 
family, sick, disability, personal, bereavement, weddings, jury duty, military 
service, educational, government service, and sabbatical.113 These new forms of 
leave expand coverage to more situations and move away from the focus on women 
and family to a focus on workers’ liberty interests in structuring their work and 
personal lives. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. Case, supra note 9, at 1781. 
 108. See BELLA DE PAULO, SINGLED OUT: HOW SINGLES ARE STEREOTYPED, 
STIGMATIZED, AND IGNORED, AND STILL LIVE HAPPILY EVER AFTER 255 (2006) (arguing that 
single people “get last dibs on vacation time, travel options, and choice of assignments 
because the obligations and interests that make their lives meaningful are deemed less 
important than the outside-of-work commitments of married people”); see also ELINOR 
BURKETT, THE BABY BOON: HOW FAMILY-FRIENDLY AMERICA CHEATS THE CHILDLESS 
(2000) (similar).  
 109. EEOC, supra note 14. 
 110. State Family and Medical Leave Laws That Are More Expansive Than the Federal 
FMLA, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/ 
DocServer/StatesandunpaidFMLLaws.pdf?docID=968 [hereinafter NAT’L P’SHIP FOR 
WOMEN & FAMILIES]. 
 111. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(3) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). One scholar argues that these 
reforms have laid the groundwork for future laws expanding the definition of family under 
other provisions of the FMLA. Marcy Karin, Time Off for Military Families: An Emerging 
Case Study in a Time of War . . . and the Tipping Point for Future Laws Supporting Work-
Life Balance?, 33 RUTGERS L. REC. 46 (2009). 
 112. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 110. 
 113. 2 HR SERIES POLICIES AND PRACTICES § 109:18 (2010) (providing a checklist of 
potential topics for an employee handbook); id. § 207:8 (discussing trends in paid leave, 
such as sabbatical leave for mid- to upper-level executives). 
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As with anti-bullying legislation, the U.S. approach to work-life issues stands in 
contrast to that of Europe.114 The United States and Australia are the only liberal 
welfare states that do not mandate some form of paid leave.115 Statutes in Belgium, 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands require flexible working rights for all 
employees, while under U.K. law employees with childcare or caregiving 
responsibilities have the right to request flexibility.116 The difference might be 
explained by contrasting attitudes toward social entitlements,117 or by the fact that 
the European policies were intended to stem declining fertility rates and labor 
shortages, problems that are not on the radar in the United States.118 Whatever the 
reason, the average European worker works three hundred fewer hours per year 
than the average U.S. worker.119 
Some scholars go beyond the equality focus to argue that in the ideal workplace, 
“job-protected, paid leave would provide not only time off from work for family-
related reasons, but also time away from the job for the pursuit of other life 
endeavors such as education, rest, or rejuvenation that would make a worker more 
productive.”120 Advocates refer to “manifold” reasons an employee might require 
flexible work arrangements, from caring for an elderly parent, to attending a 
weekly Bible session, to volunteer engagements.121 The EEOC has concluded that 
employers should adopt best practices to allow “all workers,” regardless of sex, “to 
balance work and personal responsibilities.”122  
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. See Saul Levmore, Parental Leave and American Exceptionalism, 58 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 203 (2007); Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking 
Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 115. See The World’s Women Reports, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.K/WWW/ 
16/Rev.5, UNITED NATIONS STATISTICS DIV. (Apr. 22, 2005), http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ 
demographic/products/indwm/ww2005/tab5c.htm. Lesotho, Papua New Guinea, and 
Swaziland also do not provide paid leave. Id. 
 116. ARIANE HEGEWISCH, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, EQUALITY & HUMAN 
RIGHTS COMM’N, FLEXIBLE WORKING POLICIES: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW, at iii (2009), 
available at 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/research/16_flexibleworking.pdf. 
Australia also provides employees with children the right to request flexible work 
arrangements. Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ch 2 pt 2 div 4 (Austl.). 
 117. See Linda A. White, The United States in Comparative Perspective: Maternity and 
Parental Leave and Child Care Benefits Trends in Liberal Welfare States, 21 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 185, 190–92 (2009). 
 118. See Levmore, supra note 114, at 207–10. Moreover, paid leave is less expensive in 
countries with low fertility rates. Id. at 208. 
 119. Marcello Estevão & Filipa Sá, The 35-Hour Workweek in France: Straightjacket or 
Welfare Improvement?, 23 ECON. POL’Y 417, 420 (2008).  
 120. Patricia A. Shiu & Stephanie M. Wildman, Pregnancy Discrimination and Social 
Change: Evolving Consciousness About a Worker’s Right to Job-Protected, Paid Leave, 21 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 120–21 (2009); see also Case, supra note 9, at 1786 (“Just as for 
the ancient Israelites the promised land flowed with milk and honey, so for modern feminists 
it would offer all inhabitants, regardless of sex or of their need to give or receive care, the 
time and resources and liberty to pursue their freely chosen life projects unconstrained.”). 
 121. Feldblum, supra note 9, at 270. 
 122. EEOC, supra note 14. 
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In the mid-1990s, corporations and human-resources professionals moved from 
the term “work-family” to the term “work-life.”123 A national survey of employers 
found that many had adopted flexible work options such as part-time, job-sharing, 
time off, compressed workweeks, employee control over work hours, and 
telecommuting.124 Some state laws give certain employees the right to ask for such 
arrangements.125 A few workplaces have abandoned the time clock altogether, 
allowing each worker the discretion to decide when to work and measuring 
performance based on whether deadlines are met and results achieved.126 Other 
feminists propose a broad range of universal solutions, from shortened workweeks 
to containing suburban sprawl.127 Whatever the specific policy, the norm has 
shifted to universality: “[W]hile work-life policies historically were adopted with a 
goal of breaking down barriers to the inclusion of women and those with caregiving 
demands, the goals of work-life policies have now broadened to include a multitude 
of nonwork identities.”128  
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. Paulette R. Gerkovich, Work-Life Policy and Practice in the USA: Gendered 
Premise, Radical Potential?, in WORK-LIFE BALANCE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 276, 
279 (Fiona Jones, Ronald J. Burke & Mina Westman eds., 2006). 
 124. JAMES T. BOND, ELLEN GALINSKY, STACY S. KIM & ERIN BROWNFIELD, FAMILIES & 
WORK INST., 2005 NATIONAL STUDY OF EMPLOYERS (2005), available at 
http://familiesandwork.org/site/research/reports/2005nse.pdf; see also Arnow-Richman, 
supra note 9, at 1095.  
 125. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-610 (West 2008) (school employees may apply to job 
share); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-18-107 (2009) (job sharing); OR. REV. STAT. § 240.855 (2009) 
(state agency employees may request telecommuting arrangements). 
 126. See Erin L. Kelly & Phyllis Moen, Rethinking the ClockWork of Work: Why 
Schedule Control May Pay Off at Work and at Home, 9 ADVANCES IN DEVELOPING HUM. 
RESOURCES 487 (2007); see also Michelle Conlin, Gap to Employees: Work Wherever, 
Whenever You Want, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 17, 2009, 
http://www.businessweek.com/careers/managementiq/archives/2009/09/gap_to_employee.ht
ml (discussing initiatives at Best Buy and the Gap Outlet corporate headquarters). 
 127. See JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY, AND 
GENDER INEQUALITY 182–85 (2004); Schultz, supra note 9, at 1942, 1947–48, 1956–57 
(proposing restructuring of the labor market to shorten the workweek, democratize 
workplaces, and subsidize a living wage); Schultz & Hoffman, supra note 12, at 133–34. 
The range of policy options falling under the work-family label extends far beyond the 
workplace. See, e.g., Selmi & Cahn, supra note 88, at 9 (advocating more state-funded 
childcare in the form of lengthened school days and before- and afterschool programs); 
Katharine B. Silbaugh, Women’s Place: Urban Planning, Housing Design, and Work-Family 
Balance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1797, 1800 (2007) (proposing containing suburban sprawl 
and designing better houses to reduce commute and housework burdens).  
 128. Ann Marie Ryan & Ellen Ernst Kossek, Work-Life Policy Implementation: Breaking 
Down or Creating Barriers to Inclusiveness?, 47 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 295, 298 (2008) 
(internal citation omitted); see also Brad Harrington & Jamie J. Ladge, Work-Life 
Integration: Present Dynamics and Future Directions for Organizations, 38 ORG. DYNAMICS 
148, 148 (2009) (“Rooted in the history of women’s rights and equal opportunity in 
education and the workplace, the notion of work-life has shifted in focus from solely a 
woman’s concern to a workforce management issue.”). But see FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 177 (2009) (arguing that tools of equal opportunity like flextime and 
grievance procedures were in the “personnel arsenal” before the women’s movement arrived 
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II. THE UNIVERSAL TURN IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION THEORY 
The foregoing discussion suggests why universal protections are seen as the cures 
to the ailments of sexual harassment law and family leave policy. These universal 
protections are connected to a broader universalist paradigm for approaching 
discrimination. In this Part, I describe this universal turn and discuss the purported 
advantages of such a shift in terms of equality. I also identify potential disadvantages 
for those concerned with antidiscrimination. I conclude that the purported advantages 
and disadvantages of the universal turn are theoretical. By theoretical, I mean that it 
cannot be assumed that any particular policy will result in these effects. Particular 
policies must be analyzed in context to determine whether they would fulfill the 
theoretical promise of universalist theory. Part III will take up such a contextual 
inquiry with respect to anti-bullying rules and work-life accommodations. 
A. Defining the Universal Turn 
The universal frame is distinct from the two conventional paradigms for 
understanding discrimination—anticlassification and antisubordination—both of 
which rely on protected or prohibited identity categorizations like race or sex.129 
The anticlassification principle prohibits rules that differentiate based on race or 
other forbidden characteristics, while the antisubordination principle prohibits rules 
that create or reinforce caste systems based on race or other group affiliations.130 
By contrast, the new universalism endeavors to draw attention to problems once 
seen as issues of inequality without recourse to identity categories.131 It does so by 
(1) changing the axis of protection from identity traits to universal conditions like 
vulnerability,132 (2) shifting focus from equal rights to universal rights like 
liberty133 or dignity,134 or (3) moving away from condemnation of prejudice toward 
banning disrespect135 or irrational decision making.136  
                                                                                                                 
on the scene). Although policies like flextime did not become strategies for women’s 
equality until the 1980s, id. at 179, the conventional wisdom is that flexible work 
arrangements were historically accommodations for women.  
 129. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003). 
 130. See id. at 9–10. 
 131. See supra note 12. For a discussion of universalism’s revival as a theoretical 
position, see generally Linda M.G. Zerilli, This Universalism Which Is Not One, 28 
DIACRITICS 3 (1998).  
 132. See Fineman, supra note 12, at 21. 
 133. See YOSHINO, supra note 12, at 190; Yoshino, supra note 12, at 792. 
 134. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions 
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1736–53 (2008). I note that Yoshino uses the 
term “dignity” to refer to the synthesis of equality and liberty concerns. Yoshino, supra note 
12, at 749. For purposes of this Article, I follow Whitman and Freidman in referring to 
“dignity” as an independent concept that refers to “being shown deference and respect in 
everyday interaction,” which may either coexist or be at odds with “equality,” defined as 
freedom from discrimination on the basis of certain prejudices. See Friedman & Whitman, 
supra note 64, at 264, 268–70.  
 135. See Fisk, supra note 8, at 94–95. 
 136. See YOSHINO, supra note 12, at 177. 
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The following grid attempts to collect the terms associated with the 
antisubordination, anticlassification, and universalist paradigms of discrimination: 
 
FIGURE 1 
THREE APPROACHES TO DISCRIMINATION 
 Antisubordination Anticlassification Universalism 
Value at 
Stake Social Equality Civil Equality 
Liberty / 
Dignity 
Paradigmatic 
Policy Redistribution Antidifferentiation Human Rights 
Role of 
Reform Leveling Neutrality 
Expanding 
Protection 
Goal of 
Policy Accommodation Assimilation Transformation 
Protected 
Identity Difference Sameness Balance 
Relevant 
Unit Groups Individuals Humanity 
Harm of 
Harassment 
Enforcement of 
Gender Norms 
Sex-Based 
Differentiation 
Abusive 
Environments 
Harm of 
Inflexible Work 
Subordination of 
Mothers 
Discrimination 
Against Parents 
Work-Life 
Conflicts 
 
The point of this grid is simply to provide a provisional map of a changing 
lexicon of associated ideas, not to imply any conceptual clarity, rigorous 
distinctions, or chronological evolution. Indeed, many particular legal rules could 
be characterized as fitting within two or three of these rubrics. Universalism does 
not seem to be an independent third way, nor does it seem to be the synthesis of the 
antisubordination and anticlassification positions. Nonetheless, it has the potential 
to offer common ground for adherents of both the antisubordination and 
anticlassification models.137 The model avoids identity categories, appealing to 
those who oppose group-based protections, while promising universal structural 
change that will improve conditions for everyone, appealing to those concerned 
with subordination. But in practice, would this model be blind to identity 
categories? Would it resolve subordination along with universal harms? It is 
important to consider how legal rules framed in terms of the “new” category might 
entail the benefits and drawbacks of the old ones.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. Cf. Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal 
Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 977–78 (2010) (describing the “cross-ideological appeal” of 
post-racialism). 
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B. Theoretical Advantages of the Universal Turn 
The universal turn would have the advantage of providing coverage to groups 
not always cognizable under equality jurisprudence, including those who face 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.138 In addition to expanding 
protection to everyone, advocates of the universal turn argue that it would advance 
equality, by avoiding “essentialism” and “backlash.”  
1. Essentialism 
One of the motivating impulses behind the universal turn is to avoid “making 
assumptions about group cultures.”139 Because universalist solutions focus on 
values like liberty or dignity, rather than claims to identity, they would theoretically 
avoid essentialist ideas about identity groups such as “men” or “women.”  
Anti-essentialism entails rejection of gender stereotyping—associating certain 
behaviors, characteristics, or aptitudes with men or women.140 Any claim to rights 
based on “women’s experiences” is essentialist because it assumes the category of 
women has a unitary and coherent essence, whether based in biology or culture.  
Another aspect of anti-essentialism is opposition to generalizations: rejecting 
“the notion that a unitary, ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and 
described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of 
experience.”141 Intersecting axes of oppression, such as sexism, racism, classism, 
and homophobia, cannot be reduced to just one dynamic. In addition to the 
descriptive problems, there are normative problems with gender essentialism: 
understanding oppression through the tunnel vision of a theory of gender 
subordination may replicate other patterns of oppression.  
Other feminists have argued that in creating rights against discrimination, the 
law produces the very stigmatized identities it is intended to protect. Judith Butler 
disputes that gender is “a timeless and inalterable ideal.”142 She describes gender as 
a social norm that “only persists as a norm to the extent that it is acted out in social 
                                                                                                                 
 
 138. See Fineman, supra note 12, at 3. 
 139. YOSHINO, supra note 12, at 189; see also id. at 191 (“While it need not do so, the 
equality paradigm is prone to essentializing the identities it protects.”); Yoshino, supra note 
12, at 795–96. 
 140. This theory has had some appeal for the Supreme Court. In Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, the Court held that “we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate 
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their 
group,” and that no woman should be placed in a “catch 22” by “[a]n employer who objects 
to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait.” 490 U.S. 228, 251 
(1989), modified by statute on other grounds recognized in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 
U.S. 90, 98–102 (2003); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) 
(finding that equal protection prohibits “overbroad generalizations about the different talents, 
capacities, or preferences of males and females”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
685 (1973) (describing a history of “gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes” in the 
United States). 
 141. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 581, 585 (1990). 
 142. JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 48 (2004).  
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practice and reidealized and reinstituted in and through the daily social rituals of 
bodily life.”143 At the same time that feminists build legal fences around women to 
keep danger out, they are fencing women into constricting spaces: 
To have a right as a woman is not to be free of being designated and 
subordinated by gender. Rather, though it may entail some protection 
from the most immobilizing features of that designation, it reinscribes 
the designation as it protects us, and thus enables our further regulation 
through that designation.144  
For example, rights for women based on their roles as mothers do not simply reflect 
the reality that many women are mothers; they promote that vision of reality. The 
only “women” recognized by such a law will be mothers. Worse yet, whether 
women’s roles as mothers are seen as fixed by nature or nurture, the appeal to static 
gender roles makes resistance seem futile.145 This problem is debilitating to the 
goal of undermining the gender norms that lock women into lives as mothers. Legal 
rights based on gender may prevent people from dividing, sharing, permuting, and 
questioning gender roles.  
Essentialism is a problem not just for identity, but also for institutions, such as 
the family (i.e., the idea that the essence of family is the sexualized union of a man 
and a woman for purposes of procreation), and concepts, such as sexuality (i.e., the 
idea that the essence of sexuality is heterosexual domination). To inscribe concepts 
like “sex” and “family” into the law is to invite stereotypical constriction of their 
meanings and to exclude outsiders from normative consideration. For example, 
legal rules that allow only “family” members to inherit rent-stabilized apartments 
can be difficult to enforce for same-sex partners.146 
2. Backlash 
A second theoretical advantage of the universal turn is avoiding the dangerous 
political dynamics that result when the law seems to be “picking favorites among 
                                                                                                                 
 
 143. Id. Butler also deconstructs the divide between biological sex and cultural gender. 
This is not to deny biological differences, but to argue that we can only recognize and 
understand those differences through culture. See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 866–68 
(reading Butler as making a weak performative claim, not that “there is no biological 
substrate to sex,” but rather, that “there may be a biological component to sex, but that we 
will never be sure what that biological component is, as we can only apprehend it through 
culture (that is, gender)”). 
 144. Wendy Brown, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 
420, 422 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (emphasis in original). 
 145. See Schultz, supra note 9, at 1892–93. 
 146. Compare 390 W. End Assocs. v. Wildfoerster, 661 N.Y.S.2d 202, 202–03 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1997) (stating that a “very close, loving relationship” in which a partner cared for 
a tenant dying of AIDS was insufficient to qualify as a “family” relationship), with AFE 
Realty Corp. v. Diamond, No. 2004-219 KC, slip op. (N.Y. App. Term, May 23, 2005) 
(finding a familial relationship where the tenant cared for the occupant of the apartment 
during his teenage years while his mother was sick, and later babysat his children in 
exchange for help with shopping and paying bills). 
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groups.”147 Legal rules caught up in “identity politics” can result in backlash, 
leading to stigmatization of the identity group seeking recognition and polarization 
of discussion. The result is to transfer the costs of the new policy to those it was 
intended to protect.148 The arguments for universal protection, by contrast, 
demonstrate how issues brought to light by the women’s movement point to larger 
problems with the structure of the work environment for everyone.149 Seeing the 
harm as a universal threat to dignity or autonomy avoids the politically fraught 
process of drawing lines around identity groups.  
Policies that appear to confer “special rights” can result in a counterproductive 
dynamic of stigmatization.150 Political projects aimed at recognizing an identity 
group and redistributing resources to that group “leav[e] intact the deep structures 
that generate . . . disadvantage” and so “must make surface reallocations again and 
again.”151 Affirmative action is a case study in the political limits of identity 
politics. Advocates of affirmative action argued that purportedly meritocratic 
processes of selection in education and employment were in fact skewed toward 
privileged groups due to lingering effects of historical discrimination and current 
forms of implicit bias.152 But by the mid-1990s, opponents of affirmative action had 
characterized the policy as “unnecessary, unfair, and even un-American.”153 Even 
those sympathetic to the “moral and empirical force” of the arguments for 
affirmative action recognized that “there is a sense in which [these arguments were] 
not being heard.”154 Affirmative-action advocates were unable to reframe the 
debate because “[t]he most compelling moral claims [were] simply dismissed as 
special-interest pleading.”155 Once “affirmative action” became anathema it had to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. YOSHINO, supra note 12, at 188; see also Fineman, supra note 12, at 4; cf. Yoshino, 
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FRASER, supra note 15, at 23. 
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Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
 153. Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the 
Innovative Ideal, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 954 (1996). 
 154. Id. at 955. 
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be recast in terms of “diversity”—an ideal that aspires to inclusion rather than 
equality.156  
Relatedly, labeling a problem as “discrimination” can backfire.157 Second-
generation forms of discrimination—for example, unexplained gender hierarchies 
in the workplace—often overlap with “patterns of bad management, general worker 
abuse, or other unprofessional conduct.”158 Calling the problem “sexism” may 
result in a climate of hostility and recriminations rather than an atmosphere 
conducive to problem solving.159 The process of drawing the “boundary lines 
between unprofessional and discriminatory conduct can deflect attention from the 
institutional dysfunction producing both types of problems.”160 A close case 
becomes the focus of dissensus in the workplace, “pos[ing] the greatest risk of 
polarization, delegitimation of the antidiscrimination norm, and perceived 
unfairness if addressed primarily as a question of whether the challenged behavior 
should be punished because it technically crossed the legal line.”161  
C. Theoretical Disadvantages of the Universal Turn 
The universal turn also entails potential risks in terms of equality, which I refer 
to as “assimilation” and “dilution.” 
1. Assimilation 
Assimilation is the downside of crafting legal protections to avoid essentialist 
notions of identity.162 Rights that are tailored to women’s experiences risk 
essentializing those experiences and reinforcing women’s subordination, but 
                                                                                                                 
 
 156. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How 
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 158. Sturm, supra note 25, at 472. 
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 160. Sturm, supra note 25, at 472–73. 
 161. Id. at 478. 
 162. See Joan C. Williams, Reconstructive Feminism: Changing the Way We Talk About 
Gender and Work Thirty Years After the PDA, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 79, 90 (2009). 
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generic rights fail to redress specific harms typically suffered by women.163 Martha 
Minow has referred to this problem as the “dilemma of difference.”164 Feminists 
have long debated whether gender-blind or gender-conscious remedies can best 
address discrimination. This debate is relevant to whether universal or targeted 
solutions are best. 
Generic rights may assist only those whose lives are patterned in the mold of the 
privileged group. And worse, by making that mold seem more inclusive, generic 
rights may legitimate structural conditions that contribute to inequality. The 
problem with status-blind solutions is the myth of neutrality:  
Equal treatment requires everyone to be measured according to the 
same norms, but in fact there are no “neutral” norms of behavior and 
performance. Where some groups are privileged and others oppressed, 
the formulation of law, policy, and the rules of private institutions tend 
to be biased in favor of the privileged groups, because their particular 
experience implicitly sets the norm. 165  
Gender-neutral rules assist “mostly women who have been able to construct a 
biography that somewhat approximates the male norm.”166 To give a simple 
example: a school admissions test that rewards students for making educated 
guesses may seem objective, but if cultural norms inculcate risk-taking behavior in 
males and discourage it in females, males will come out ahead on the test. The 
females who succeed on the test will be those who had the resources or the luck to 
learn risk taking. Although legal rules may be blind to difference, society and the 
economy are not. Inequality in any one sphere—whether the home, the workplace, 
or public life—can create inequality in the others.167  
To gain rights equal to those of the privileged group, a disadvantaged group 
must argue that it is like the privileged group in all relevant respects.168 By 
accepting the baseline norm without question, and showing that it is amenable to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 163. See Brown, supra note 144, at 430. 
 164. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND 
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37 (1987). 
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34, at 779–80.  
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the inclusion of disadvantaged groups, those disadvantaged groups bolster the 
legitimacy of the baseline norm, and worsen the adverse sanctions for those who 
would challenge or deviate from that norm. For example, some queer theorists 
oppose the movement to legalize same-sex marriage because it would strengthen 
the hegemony of marriage as an institution by demonstrating that marriage can 
stretch to accommodate same-sex couples.169 
I add to this account of assimilation by observing that assimilation can also 
operate on the level of norms. For example, antidiscrimination norms might be lost 
if they are assimilated into universal norms. To give an example, a generic 
“diversity” norm that focuses on all forms of difference rather than historically 
salient patterns of subordination could mean that “the white farm boy from Idaho is 
considered as important to firm diversity as the black inner-city kid from Los 
Angeles on the basis of geographic diversity, . . . justify[ing] a workforce that is 
primarily white or male (but is diverse on other dimensions).”170  
2. Dilution 
Universal expansion of civil rights laws also presents another new risk. It could 
dilute the rights of disadvantaged groups by trivializing the more serious harms of 
discrimination and undermining support for antidiscrimination in general. 
Moreover, it is likely to cost more to protect an expanded class of beneficiaries 
from an expanded class of harms. Due to these increased costs, the level of 
protection may be watered down. 
Such arguments have been made against extending civil rights protections to 
new groups or activities. Richard Thompson Ford has argued that “the fight for 
social justice” is “an exercise in discretion as well as valor.”171 Ford argues that it 
dilutes protection to analogize racism to other, less “serious” harms, such as 
discriminatory grooming requirements,172 failure to recognize gay marriage,173 
mistreatment of animals,174 and employment discrimination based on 
appearance.175 Like the boy who cried “wolf,”176 those who cry “racism” too often 
may lose protection when they need it most. “The good-natured humanitarian who 
listens attentively to the first claim of social injustice will become an impatient 
curmudgeon after multiple similar admonishments. . . . If goodwill is exhausted and 
popular opinion sours, the coercive force of law will be of little effect.”177 Ford’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE 
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argument has all the more force in the context of the universal turn, where the goal 
is not just to expand protections incrementally, but to universalize them. 
However, Ford’s argument relies on two assumptions, which may or may not 
apply in any given policy context. First, Ford assumes “that there is a small, fixed 
quantity of goodwill for civil rights causes, which should be used sparingly on the 
most worthwhile of them.”178 At least with respect to the federal judiciary, Ford 
may be right. Since Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly changed the pleading standard 
in federal courts to allow district judges to dismiss claims they deem implausible,179 
the rate of dismissal of discrimination cases has increased in a larger increment 
than the rate of dismissal of other types of cases.180 When the extent of protection is 
left up to the private sector, sometimes the response to the legal requirement that 
everyone be treated the same is to treat everyone equally badly. For example, after 
the Montana Supreme Court held that a state employer could not allow unmarried 
cross-sex couples to purchase health insurance if unmarried same-sex couples could 
not, the Montana Blue Cross Blue Shield dropped all unmarried couples from 
coverage.181 To make a more simple point—more expansive workplace protections 
require more resources for enforcement, such as an administrative agency or human 
resources personnel, which can trade off with resources previously devoted to 
assisting victims of discrimination.182  
Second, Ford assumes that those playing the race card in new contexts will not 
succeed in convincing the public that the analogy to racism is strong.183 But many 
social movements have succeeded by analogizing new forms of discrimination to 
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old ones.184 Ultimately, the question is whether a new claim of injustice has 
merit.185  
To make a different but related point, expanding protections to all can water 
down protections for some, because rights must be more abstract and narrow to 
apply to more contexts.186 For example, scholars have warned that extending 
constitutional rights to noncitizens could “pose dangers to constitutional rights at 
home” because “constitutional protections may suffer dilution when they are 
extended into areas previously thought outside their coverage.”187 “Arguments for 
limiting the rights in their new application have a way of filtering back to 
undermine the original core.”188 Expanding a civil rights remedy may result in 
lesser protections in the new context, with those limitations drifting back into the 
core doctrine. 
D. Assessing Particular Examples of the Universal Turn 
The foregoing discussion provides a set of questions for critiquing any novel 
universalist policy initiative to expand civil rights laws beyond equality. Does 
universalization of an antidiscrimination rule avoid gender essentialism and the 
political backlash against targeted protections? Or does it require a form of 
assimilation that obscures gender discrimination and dilutes the resources available 
to address it? These questions are important to any scholar or policy maker 
concerned about whether particular protections can combat gender inequality.189  
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This is not to say that feminism is the only metric for evaluating policy.190 
Rather, this Article aims to refute the claim that universalized protections would be 
good for everyone, or that universalizing protections is the best way to secure 
gender equality. An analysis of this sort may not reveal whether a universal policy 
is beneficial from a utilitarian perspective,191 but it does reveal whether those 
committed to equality should prioritize universal policies, and whether and how 
those committed to equality should seek to modify policy proposals. 
Essentialism, backlash, assimilation, and dilution are problems likely to 
manifest themselves in varying degrees in response to any workplace protection. 
The risk of any one of these problems is not a reason to reject a policy proposal, but 
rather, something to be assessed in terms of the ultimate impact on the gendered 
division of labor.  
For example, at some level, every legal regime is essentialist: legal protections 
are constructed around prototypical victims, and “the price of receiving legal 
protection is the cost of acting in a manner that fits the prototype.”192 Yet rights 
claims, such as the right to paid work or freedom from sexual violence, have 
mitigated and attenuated gender subordination, creating the space that allows 
women to pursue any political end.193 Therefore, we “cannot not want” rights, in 
the words of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.194 Recognizing this dilemma, many 
theorists advocate “strategic essentialism.”195 This does not mean that feminists 
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should write off the risks of essentialism, just that those risks must be assessed in 
relation to the risks of other legal rules, and weighed against other potential 
advantages and disadvantages of legal regimes.196  
Likewise, assimilation is a risk that is endemic to law. As Yoshino puts it: 
“[c]ivil rights practice, after all, is fundamentally about who has to change: The 
homosexual or the homophobe? The woman or the sexist? The racial minority or 
the racist?”197 Racial minorities may engage in strategic assimilation: “[t]he radical 
multiculturalist insists that if assimilation will make greater demands on racial 
minorities than on whites, it must be summarily rejected as discriminatory. But the 
pragmatist would ask whether the unequal demands of assimilation are more or less 
severe than the likely alternatives.”198  
This Article does not endeavor to take a side in the debate between those who 
are more concerned with essentialism and those who are more concerned with 
assimilation. Nor does it assume that universal policies, rather than those targeted 
at equality, will avoid identity politics but cause dilution. These are not debates that 
can be resolved in the abstract. Rather, the preceding theoretical discussion is 
intended as a template for analysis of how the universalization of particular legal 
rules might impact gender equality. The next Part of this Article will examine anti-
bullying and work-life accommodation mandates in terms of essentialism, 
backlash, assimilation, and dilution. 
III. UNIVERSAL BUT UNEQUAL 
This Part will analyze two proposed universal policies: anti-bullying statutes, 
along the lines of the Healthy Workplace Act,199 and procedural or substantive 
rights to various types of work-life accommodations.200 Would new laws providing 
a cause of action for bullying or a right to work-life accommodations better avoid 
essentialism and backlash than targeted rules? Would they cause assimilation and 
dilution? Unfortunately, anti-bullying and work-life accommodation rights do not 
seem to resolve the problems of targeted laws. Additionally, these rules create new 
disadvantages in terms of inequality. 
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A. An Anti-Bullying Cause of Action 
1. Essentialism: Creating New Scapegoats 
Would anti-bullying rules move away from essentialist notions of gender and 
other identities that are often produced in the interpretation, application, and 
enforcement of sexual harassment law? Would universal rules avoid stigmatizing 
women as potential plaintiffs and squelching any expression of sexuality in the 
workplace?201 This Part concludes that while anti-bullying rules would avoid some 
of the forms of essentialism promoted by sexual harassment law, they would not 
necessarily avoid stigmatizing women or allowing employers to enforce puritanical 
standards. This conclusion is provisional because no U.S. jurisdiction has yet 
adopted an anti-bullying statute that can be studied empirically; however, 
comparative legal scholarship suggests cause for concern. 
a. Increased Inclusivity? 
To be sure, an anti-bullying rule has many advantages over a sexual harassment 
rule when it comes to avoiding essentialism. Defining harassment sans 
discrimination would move away from gender stereotypes in which “women are 
uniquely vulnerable to men[,] . . . men are always vulgar and loutish, or . . . women 
have ‘special’ sensitivities and rights that men do not share.”202 An anti-bullying 
rule would also avoid essentialist generalizations by protecting individuals harassed 
for complex reasons—including hostility on account of a victim’s position at the 
intersections and margins of identity groups. And an anti-bullying regime would 
not privilege sex or race as a prohibited basis for discrimination. It would avoid all 
suspect classes and classifications, protecting anyone from harassment, whether 
because of sex, gender, race, orientation, appearance, or even, in the words of one 
New York legislator, “[i]f somebody does not like you because you are [a] Yankees 
fan.”203 It would not involve courts in outing alleged same-sex harassers.204 It 
would not require inquiry into the often-inscrutable motives of harassers at all. 
On its face, a generic harassment ban would protect more people than a ban on 
discriminatory harassment. But even a generic harassment rule would not protect 
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everyone. Less-skilled, unorganized workers—who are more often people of color, 
women, and undocumented immigrants—are more likely to do precarious work and 
hence are more susceptible to workplace abuse.205 Yet these are the workers least 
able to bring complaints or civil litigation. And the tort experience suggests that 
courts may not recognize bullying against marginalized workers as an assault to 
dignity. If a worker is already marginalized, courts raise the bar for actionable 
offenses. “The humiliations that courts deem outrageous enough to be actionable 
seem heavily influenced by the court’s notions of status, gender, and class.”206 
Courts are likely to recognize infringements on dignity only when a high-status 
person suffers an insult to that status—for example, when the executive is punished 
with janitorial duties.207  
b. New Gender Stereotypes 
Although anti-bullying rules would expand protection to certain privileged 
workers, they would also have the unintended effects of opening new avenues for 
essentialism. Many of the essentialist problems with sexual harassment were 
unintended. For women’s stories to resonate with employers, juries, and judges, 
those stories had to conform to a prototypical account of sexual harassment in the 
workplace, generally involving crass male behavior and feminine sensitivity. 
Would an anti-bullying law differently construct workplace victims and 
perpetrators? What are the prototypical stories of workplace bullying, and how do 
they differ from the prototypical stories of sexual harassment?  
If popular culture is any guide, the prototypical workplace bully is a woman.208 
In the media’s coverage of the anti-bullying movement, news programs have aired 
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Sympathy for the Devil, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 221, 221 (2007). A large percentage of 
workplace bullies are reported to be women. See WORKPLACE BULLYING INST., (STILL) 
BULLYING WITH IMPUNITY: LABOR DAY SURVEY 2 (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.workplacebullying.org/res/N-N-2009D.pdf (reporting that 65% of workplace 
bullies are women, according to a nonscientific survey of 422 self-selected online 
respondents). But see WORKPLACE BULLYING INST. & ZOGBY INT’L, U.S. WORKPLACE 
BULLYING SURVEY 7 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.workplacebullying.org/res/N-N-
Zogby2007.pdf (reporting that 40% of workplace bullies are women, according to online 
interviews of 7740 representative adults). A self-help industry has sprung up for these so-
called “bully broads.” See, e.g., JEAN HOLLANDS, SAME GAME DIFFERENT RULES: HOW TO 
GET AHEAD WITHOUT BEING A BULLY BROAD, ICE QUEEN, OR “MS. UNDERSTOOD” (2002) 
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clips from the popular film The Devil Wears Prada to demonstrate bullying.209 In 
that movie, the title character, the editor of a successful fashion magazine, is 
criticized for sending her younger female assistants on impossible housekeeping 
and childcare errands, and treating them with cold disdain.210 At one point, the 
movie’s heroine points out the double standard: “If she were a man, the only thing 
people would talk about is how good she is at her job!”211 One feminist critic has 
concluded that the movie “transforms the genre of punishing uppity women for 
violating gender norms into a celebration of ambition in women and a recognition 
of the real behind-the-scenes labor—women’s work—which enables the 
contemporary workplace.”212 Subjecting devils in Prada to legal liability would 
work against this subversive possibility.  
Such dramas are not just in the movies; they also fill deposition transcripts. For 
example, in one discrimination case, a plaintiff testified that her female boss was 
“harassing, demeaning, bullying, vicious, vile and vindictive,” while other 
witnesses described the boss as simply “hard-nosed,” “abrupt,” and “rude,” with a 
“dominating personality.”213 The dispute was never resolved because the court held 
that the boss “was an equal opportunity oppressor, using her intense, dominant, 
abrupt, rude, and hard-nosed management style on all . . . employees.”214 If an anti-
bullying statute had applied, a judge or jury would have been required to decide 
whether this equal opportunity oppressor’s bad management tactics were illegal. In 
a culture that expects women to be caring and motherly, women would face harsher 
scrutiny than men for the same behavior.215  
                                                                                                                 
(book by “executive coach” to help intimidating women tone it down). 
 209. See, e.g., Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast Feb. 24, 2009) 
(showing a clip from The Devil Wears Prada during a segment on workplace bullying); The 
Today Show (NBC television broadcast July 14, 2009) (same).  
 210. THE DEVIL WEARS PRADA (Twentieth Century Fox 2006).  
 211. Id. For a legal example of this type of double standard, see Jeffrey Rosen, The Case 
Against Sotomayor, NEW REPUBLIC (May 4, 2009), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/the-
case-against-sotomayor (“The most consistent concern was that Sotomayor, although an able 
lawyer, was ‘not that smart and kind of a bully on the bench,’ as one former Second Circuit 
clerk for another judge put it.”). 
 212. Miller, supra note 208, at 225; see also Rebecca Traister, Sympathy for the She-
Devil, SALON.COM (June 30, 2006), http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2006/06/30/ 
women_bosses/index.html. 
 213. Frye v. St. Thomas Health Servs., 227 S.W.3d 595, 607–08 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). 
 214. Id. at 609.  
 215. See, e.g., CATALYST, THE DOUBLE-BIND DILEMMA FOR WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP: DAMNED 
IF YOU DO, DOOMED IF YOU DON’T 4, 8 (2007), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/45/the% 
20doublebind%20dilemma%20for%20women%20in%20leadership%20damned%20if%20you
%20do,%20doomed%20if%20you%20don’t.pdf (qualitative analysis of surveys of twelve hundred 
business leaders concluded that female leaders are more likely to be seen as either “too soft” or “too 
tough,” but “never just right,” and either competent or likeable, but rarely both); Victoria L. 
Brescoll & Eric Luis Uhlmann, Can an Angry Woman Get Ahead?: Status Conferral, Gender, and 
Expression of Emotion in the Workplace, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 268 (2008) (study of adults shown 
videotaped scenarios demonstrated that women who expressed anger in a professional context were 
considered entitled to lower status than men expressing the same emotion); Joan C. Williams, The 
Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases 
and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401 (2003) (discussing 
stereotypes that impede women’s workplace equality); Ramit Mizrahi, Note, “Hostility to the 
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What about the victims? Some survey data indicates that 56.7% of the victims of 
bullying are female.216 Such surveys prompt essentialist theorizing.217 One scholar 
has argued that playground socialization shunts girls into passive aggression and 
boys into active aggression, patterns replicated in adult workplace bullying 
situations.218 The analysis then veers off into essentialist territory, referring to 
“innate and socially conditioned differences” between men and women that render 
women uniquely vulnerable to bullying.219 Because the study of bullying grew out 
of industrial psychology, the phenomenon may be apt to be considered in terms of 
psychological profiles of victims and aggressors. These profiles are then marshaled 
to support essentialist conclusions about men and women. The media has latched 
onto the phenomenon of women bullying other women; some articles characterize 
this form of sabotage as a violation of “their shared identity as women,” like 
mothers eating their young.220 But as Leymann pointed out when confronted with 
similar findings in Swedish research, the sex segregation of bullying is not 
surprising when one considers that most workplaces are sex segregated.221 
And if anti-bullying rules are simply added on to sexual harassment rules, they 
will give employers more, not fewer, opportunities to employ stereotypes in 
policing workplace expression.222 Schultz asks whether holding employers liable 
for bullying would give them “a progressive justification for firing employees 
whose colorful language or aggressive styles threaten management authority, even 
if those employees aren’t genuinely abusive to anyone.”223 Groups who already 
face stereotypes, for example, African Americans who are presumed to be “overly 
aggressive,” are likely to bear the brunt of new bullying rules.224 Although anti-
                                                                                                                 
Presence of Women”: Why Women Undermine Each Other in the Workplace and the 
Consequences for Title VII, 113 YALE L.J. 1579, 1589–91 (2004). 
 216. WORKPLACE BULLYING INST. & ZOGBY INT’L, supra note 208, at 7.  
 217. See, e.g., Mizrahi, supra note 215, at 1591–93 (describing and criticizing “[b]iology- 
and socialization-based explanations for female hostility”). 
 218. Kerri Lynn Stone, From Queen Bees and WannaBes to Worker Bees: Why Gender 
Considerations Should Inform the Emerging Law of Workplace Bullying, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 35, 52–53 (2009) (discussing RACHEL SIMMONS, ODD GIRL OUT: THE HIDDEN 
CULTURE OF AGGRESSION IN GIRLS (2002)).  
 219. Id. at 62. 
 220. Mickey Meece, Backlash: Women Bullying Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2009, at 
1. By contrast, very little is written on female-on-female sexual harassment cases alleging 
gender-based hostility, rather than same-sex sexual desire. See Mizrahi, supra note 215, at 
1585–86 (counting only twenty-three such cases). 
 221. Heinz Leymann, The Content and Development of Mobbing at Work, 5 EUR. J. 
WORK & ORG. PSYCHOL. 165, 175 (1996); see also Boushey, supra note 23, at 39–40 
(describing continued sex segregation of American workforce); Mizrahi, supra note 215, at 
1594–1607 (discussing how workplace sex segregation results in “female-on-female 
hostility”). 
 222. See Vicki Schultz, Gabrielle S. Friedman, Abigail C. Saguy, Tanya K. Hernandez & 
David Yamada, Global Perspectives on Workplace Harassment Law: Proceedings of the 
2004 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and 
Employment Law, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 151, 188–89 (2004) [hereinafter Global 
Perspectives]. 
 223. Id. at 192; see also Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 59. 
 224. See Global Perspectives, supra note 222, at 188–93. 
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bullying laws have not been enforced through pre-emptive firings in Quebec, in 
that province, “workers have a right to reinstatement for unjust dismissal and are 
much more likely to be represented by a union.”225 In the United States, 
employment is at will and fewer workers are unionized.  
c. Enforcing Traditional Sexual Mores 
Anti-bullying rules have the advantage of steering the focus away from sexual 
conduct to all degrading conduct. This was part of the impetus behind France’s 
enactment of a law against moral harassment226—to avoid the “puritanical” focus 
of American sexual harassment law.227 Arguably, a moral harassment law is a step 
away from the sanitized workplace. But words like “dignity,” “civility,” and 
“decency” hearken back to an archaic aristocratic ethos, with all its puritanical 
gender norms.228 Handing these concepts over to conservative employers and 
judges may result in application of standards like “that’s no way to treat a lady.”229  
The Israeli experience with dignity-based protections provides “a cautionary 
tale” for radical reformers.230 Seeking to avoid the limitations of the American 
preoccupation with anticlassification, Israeli feminists advocated and won passage 
of a sexual harassment law grounded in both dignity and equality, with the 
emphasis on dignity.231 But the concept of dignity proved “highly susceptible to 
traditional and patriarchal interpretations.”232 For example, one harassment case 
referred to the harm as the male harasser’s violation of his duty “carefully to watch 
                                                                                                                 
 
 225. Debra Parkes, Targeting Workplace Harassment in Quebec: On Exporting a New 
Legislative Agenda, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 423, 451 (2004). 
 226. The law provides civil and criminal penalties for acts that degrade an employee’s 
right to dignity, affect an employee’s mental or physical health, or compromise an 
employee’s career. See C. TRAV. art. L122-46 to -54; see also C. PEN. art. 222-33-2.  
 227. See Friedman & Whitman, supra note 64, at 270 (“The American concern with 
sexual harassment, according to this widespread continental point of view, is of a piece with 
the American inability to accept bare breasts on television or on public beaches, with the 
illegality of prostitution in most American jurisdictions, with Americans’ comical ineptness 
in flirting and their excessive horror at adultery.”). 
 228. See Libby Adler, The Dignity of Sex, 17 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 3 (2008) 
(describing both an elitist and a universalistic sense of dignity, and arguing that the two 
meanings are analytically intertwined); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of 
Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 Yale L.J. 1151, 1168–69 (2004) (discussing etiquette 
as one of the “social roots of European dignitary law”). 
 229. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in 
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 47, at 1, 17 (arguing that the failure to 
explain why sexual coercion of women in the workplace is harmful “means that 
antidiscrimination law rather unselfconsciously incorporates a gender-conventional 
understanding of why harassment harms women (it is a form of socially inappropriate 
conduct, ‘not a nice way to treat a lady’)”).  
 230. Noya Rimalt, Stereotyping Women, Individualizing Harassment: The Dignitary 
Paradigm of Sexual Harassment Law Between the Limits of Law and the Limits of Feminism, 
19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 391, 395 (2008). 
 231. Id. at 392. 
 232. Id. at 446. 
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over” the female plaintiff—an “inexperienced young woman soldier” and a 
“precious pledge.”233 Thus, it is not clear that laws underscored by dignity 
principles would avoid essentializing sexuality any better than laws underscored by 
antidiscrimination principles. 
2. Backlash: Shifting Identity Politics 
Many anti-bullying advocates argue that their policies will avoid identity 
politics and the attendant stigmatization, backlash, and polarization.234 Appeals to 
“dignity” may resonate with persons who cannot listen to “feminism,” “women’s 
rights,” “sexism,” “sexual harassment,” and the like.235 One scholar has gone so far 
as to argue that “[t]he impression that law will aid only some people in the quest 
for a workplace free of harassment and humiliation provides a cover of legitimacy, 
and perhaps even fuel, for a backlash that may undermine all anti-discrimination 
law.”236  
However, it is not clear that enacting more anti-harassment rules would diffuse 
the backlash. Researchers are “on the fence” between (1) linking bullying to sexual 
and racial harassment, a strategy that “carries a risk that workplace bullying will 
become contaminated by association and similarly undermined as a manifestation 
of ‘political correctness,’” or (2) claiming that bullying is an entirely distinct 
phenomenon, thereby missing the opportunity to draw from the established 
discourse on sexual and racial harassment.237  
The U.S. anti-bullying movement has attempted both strategies: linking itself to 
movements for equality and claiming the universal high ground. New York’s anti-
bullying initiative is supported by the NAACP, the Business and Professional 
Women of New York State, and several unions.238 The bill’s advocates have not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 233. Id. at 419 (quoting HCJ 1284/99 Jane Doe v. IDF Commander (Galili) [1999] IsrSC 
53(2) 70). Perhaps the problem is that tying the concept of harassment to sexualized conduct, 
as Israel’s dignity-based law does, may provide a means for enforcement of retrograde 
sexual mores. Id. at 394 (“[T]he dignitary paradigm of sexual harassment is explicitly 
correlated with sexual behaviors. Courts focus on the ‘sexual’ in sexual harassment, thereby 
legitimating other forms of sex-based harassment that working women often experience.”). 
Israel chose to criminalize sexual harassment as a practice associated with “other sex 
offenses, such as ‘indecent behavior.’” Id. 
 234. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 8, at 89–90 (“[A] status-neutral approach does not 
involve a zero-sum game. That is, moving from a ‘status-based’ to a ‘status-neutral’ 
approach enlarges the pie rather than leads to battles over the size of slices . . . .”); 
Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 63 (“A tort approach to the workplace harassment of women 
emphasizes that such harassment is not wrong because women somehow have ‘special’ 
rights.”); Friedman & Whitman, supra note 64, at 272 (arguing that sexual harassment law 
appears “to create a zero-sum conflict between women and workers” that “stir[s] up 
competition among the classes of potential ‘disadvantaged’ beneficiaries”).  
 235. See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
446 (1997). 
 236. Fisk, supra note 8, at 93. 
 237. Deborah Lee, Gendered Workplace Bullying in the Restructured UK Civil Service, 
31 PERSONNEL REV. 205, 209 (2002). 
 238. See, e.g., 2010 Legislative Summary, NEW YORK HEALTHY WORKPLACE 
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foregrounded the policy’s links to sexual and racial harassment; rather, they 
characterize bullying as a public health issue, naming their legislation the “Healthy 
Workplace Bill” and invoking the need to protect human dignity.239 But this 
packaging has not obscured the anti-bullying movement’s linkages to civil rights 
controversies. In Illinois, one Christian lobbying group claims, “Many of the 
‘Bullying Programs’ are actually being used to promote and protect homosexuality 
in the workplace.”240 Other right-wing groups demanded that the bill exclude 
religious expression from the definition of “‘abusive conduct’ unless the 
[aggresssor’s] intent is to intimidate or harass.”241 Anti-bullying advocates have 
responded by referring to these lobbyists as “anti-gay” and “extremist,” and by 
exhorting legislators “to tell these hate-mongerers to keep their hands off our 
legislation designed to provide dignity for EVERYONE!!”242  
Arguably, an anti-bullying rule would eliminate any tendency for employers to 
prefer men over women in hiring out of concern that women are more likely to 
bring harassment suits.243 Expanding the class of potential workplace harassment 
plaintiffs to include individuals who are not discrimination victims could mean that 
more white men bring suit, and employers would be less likely to see women and 
minorities as costly liabilities in hiring decisions.244 But if women are stereotyped 
as both the aggressors and victims in most bullying cases, a new law could 
exacerbate the incentives not to hire female workers. 
It is also unlikely that anti-bullying rules will avoid the destructive workplace 
dynamics of accusations of status-based mistreatment. The language of “bullying” 
can make it difficult for organizations to take “collective responsibility” for the 
problem, because individuals are “repelled by the spectre of being labelled as a 
pathological predator or having to define their experiences as the victims of such a 
person.”245 To the extent that the psychological-profiling model predominates in 
the discussion on workplace harassment (as adoption of the popular name 
“bullying” suggests that it does), new rights claims are not likely to make 
workplaces any less antagonistic.  
                                                                                                                 
ADVOCATES, http://www.nyhwa.org/index.html; see also Yamada, supra note 8, at 268. 
 239. See Yamada, supra note 8, at 277–78. 
 240. Concerned Christian Americans, Christianity in the Workplace Under Attack, 
CONCERNED CHRISTIANS NEWSLETTER (Mar. 2009), http://www.concernedchristian 
americans.com/node/272. 
 241. BIG News on Illinois Healthy Workplace Bill SB3566, STOP WORKPLACE BULLYING! 
(Mar. 2010), http://bullyfreeworkplace.org/id37.html. 
 242. Current Status & News, HEALTHY WORKPLACE BILL, http://www.healthyworkplace 
bill.org/states/il/illinois.php (capitalization and punctuation in original). 
 243. Cf. supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 244. Whether this hypothesis would bear out empirically is a question for further 
research. 
 245. Caitlin Buon & Tony Buon, The ‘Bully’ Within, COUNSELING AT WORK, Summer 
2007, at 5, 8 (“[H]ow can we get the parties to the table if both parties are only able to speak 
about bullying using language that is shame-and-blame based and carries with it the 
emotional baggage of the ‘pathological’ or predatory bully when in all likelihood this does 
not reflect their actual experience?”). 
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3. Assimilation: Depoliticizing Sexism 
 
a. Undermining Sexual Harassment Law 
Bullying has been referred to as “status-neutral” or “generic” harassment, a label 
that invites the classic feminist critique of assimilationist reform strategies.246 The 
problem of bullying is not status-neutral.247 Rather, bullying often takes the form of 
sexual harassment, and even “generic” harassment disproportionately affects 
women and those who do not conform to gender norms.248 A legal response to 
bullying that does not account for the gendered nature of the injury cannot solve the 
problem.  
Part of the reason for the development of the Title VII doctrine of sexual 
harassment was that torts like intentional infliction of emotional distress failed to 
address sexual harassment.249 To prove an intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim, a plaintiff has to show that the conduct that caused the distress 
would have been “outrageous” to a reasonable person.250 Judges and juries would 
ask, “what [is] so outrageous about a dirty joke or a crude proposition . . . ?”251 
“[M]ale judges . . . could not see why come-ons, however crude, should not be seen 
as compliments and . . . could not understand why women should not just have to 
put up with dirty jokes if they wanted to participate in a male world.”252 The norm 
established by tort law was one in which sexist joking and crude propositions were 
just part of doing business. To survive in such environments, women had to 
assimilate to the discriminatory culture. They had to accept that they were going to 
be considered the objects of jokes and sexual advances, rather than being seen as 
equally qualified workers. Tort law could not account for sexual harassment as a 
mode of gender subordination. Crafting a new cause of action under Title VII was 
not just a legal strategy, but also a political move designed to highlight the 
gendered dimensions of the problem of workplace harassment.253 
                                                                                                                 
 
 246. See Corbett, supra note 8, at 140–42 (“[S]tatus-blind harassment law is grounded on 
arguments made by proponents of the formal equality theory of employment anti-
discrimination law, or perhaps more pointedly, opponents of the protected-class theory.”). 
 247. See Fisk, supra note 8, at 80 (“To the extent that law has focused more 
systematically on the humiliation of women and people of color at work, the focus is 
justifiable because of the extraordinary destructiveness of being shamed for one’s very 
identity and because of the pervasiveness of such humiliation that members of the dominant 
group never need confront.”). 
 248. See Fisk, supra note 8, at 80; McGinley, supra note 32, at 1154–55. 
 249. Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 33. Ehrenreich nonetheless concludes that a 
reinvigorated workplace tort regime could now supplement sexual harassment law. Id. at 3–
4. 
 250. Id. at 33. 
 251. Id.  
 252. Id. 
 253. MacKinnon rejected gender-neutral approaches to sexual harassment because, “by 
treating the incidents as if they are outrages particular to an individual woman rather than 
integral to her social status as a woman worker,” gender-neutral rules failed to redress 
gender dominance. MACKINNON, supra note 29, at 88. 
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An anti-harassment rule focused on dignity, rather than gender, could undermine 
the impetus for courts, employers, and employees to consider how certain 
workplace interactions contribute to gender subordination.254 If discriminatory 
harassment is subsumed under the broader category of bullying, “we may lose sight 
altogether of the more subtle and insidious ways that harassment is linked to 
discrimination and structural inequality in workplaces.”255 The psychological 
theories that explain bullying sit uneasily with the theory of sexual harassment as 
gender subordination. Indeed, many of the mobbing researchers have been 
ambivalent as to whether gender is even a factor in the phenomenon.256 It is not the 
case that we must always name gender discrimination to fix it;257 just as 
discrimination may operate in subtle or unconscious ways, so may its solutions. But 
it is a fair point that because it may be easier to label conduct as bullying, 
employers may ignore how bullying could be part of a pattern of discrimination.258 
In a typical German labor-law text, the pages covering mobbing far outnumber 
those on sexual harassment.259 In that country, women may have less access to 
grievance resolution procedures to address mobbing than established male 
workers.260 In this country too, labor movements have been slow to recognize 
sexual harassment complaints.261 
                                                                                                                 
 
 254. Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1169, 1187–88 (1998) (“Triers of fact may not recognize the gendered forms that 
disrespect takes. Employers charged with prevention may not recognize the subtly 
stereotypic or devaluative attitudes that increasingly fuel harassment as women move into 
the workplace in greater numbers and as competition becomes more intense. Employees 
asked to modify their behavior prospectively may not grasp the range of conduct that is 
forbidden or the underlying attitudes that need to be re-examined.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 255. Parkes, supra note 225, at 449; see also Lee, supra note 237, at 209 (“[I]f sexual and 
racial harassment are defined as only types of bullying, this might undermine the specificity 
and visibility of sexual and racial harassment.”). 
 256. See Lee, supra note 237, at 206–08 (describing the various views of bullying 
researchers on the connection between bullying and sexual and racial harassment). 
 257. But see Parkes, supra note 225, at 450. 
 258. Id. at 451. 
 259. Friedman & Whitman, supra note 64, at 257 (“A standard 2001 handbook on 
German labor law will now devote a couple of sentences to sexual harassment as ‘a special 
legislative expression of the protection of personality’—and then go on to devote several 
pages to mobbing.”). 
 260. See Gabrielle S. Friedman, The Real Harm, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2003, at 30, 
34 (“In Germany, anecdotal evidence suggests that men—many of them middle managers—
are more likely than women to bring mobbing complaints to their firm’s grievance resolution 
boards.”). 
 261. See Marion Crain, Strategies for Union Relevance in a Post-Industrial World: 
Reconceiving Antidiscrimination Rights as Collective Rights, 57 LAB. L.J. 158, 162 (2006) 
(“Threats to male workers’ job security posed by women’s sexual harassment complaints are 
viewed as raising collective economic issues that are the traditional province of unions, 
while the right to be free from sexual harassment on the job is conceived of as a 
noneconomic, personal, individual interest.”). 
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b. Depoliticizing Harassment 
A bullying rule could “neuter” sexual harassment law through an “apolitical” 
account of the harm.262 Enacting a rule to remedy harassment as a dignitary injury 
could obscure the significance of harassment as a tool of discrimination.263 Even 
worse, it could be part of a political project that denies the existence of 
discrimination in a post-racist, post-sexist era. Indeed, one scholar attributes the 
rise of status-neutral initiatives to the fact that “a significant segment of society 
believes that forty years of powerful legal intervention has abated virulent 
workplace discrimination against African Americans, women, and others.”264 In 
Canada too, “much of the literature on bullying and psychological harassment 
contains the implicit or explicit assumption that sexual harassment is no longer a 
problem or, at least, is much less of a problem than workplace bullying.”265 
Some scholars advocate a substitutive approach that would replace sexual 
harassment law with a gender-neutral regime.266 Other scholars reject the 
substitutive approach as antifeminist and advocate an additive approach: allow 
victims to “have it both ways” by raising Title VII claims alongside claims of 
dignitary injuries.267 But even the additive legal approach risks undermining 
feminist political concerns.268 Workplace harassment law has an enormous 
expressive effect because it regulates quotidian interactions, sets standards of 
etiquette, and is a topic of public fascination.269 Dignity is depoliticizing.270 “Say 
‘dignity,’ and you have opened the class of women to the competition of a 
numberless population of those who feel themselves no less oppressed.”271  
                                                                                                                 
 
 262. Abrams, supra note 254, at 1185–86. 
 263. Id. at 1186–87 (acknowledging that harassment injures a worker’s dignity, but 
cautioning that “if we do not appreciate that this dignitary injury is a function of, and 
connected to, other injuries within an unequal, hierarchical relationship, we miss much of 
what is morally and politically significant about the wrong”).  
 264. Corbett, supra note 8, at 100. 
 265. Parkes, supra note 225, at 448. 
 266. For defenses of the substitutive approach, see Coleman, supra note 8, at 89–90; 
Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassment as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment 
Liability Should Be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REV. 375 (1998); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual 
Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 333 
(1990).  
 267. Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 62. Ehrenreich focuses on expanding tort remedies, 
although she notes the possibility of a “state statutory approach to workplace harassment.” 
Id. at 54 n.244; see also Yamada, Crafting, supra note 60, at 507 (“The Healthy Workplace 
Bill is meant to supplement, not supplant, current laws against discrimination and 
harassment grounded in a target’s protected class status.”). 
 268. See Friedman & Whitman, supra note 64, at 272 (Although, “[w]ithin the 
intellectual world of the law, it makes no logical sense to respond to the claim ‘women are 
being harassed’ with the riposte, ‘well everybody else is harassed too[,]’ . . . that kind of 
riposte is devastating indeed within the logic of everyday political argument.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 269. Id.  
 270. See id. at 273. 
 271. Id. 
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In other countries that have enacted generic harassment bans, the feminist 
objections to gender-based harassment have taken a back seat. In Europe, the 
“movement against employee harassment is beginning to submerge the movement 
against sexual harassment.”272 There, sexual harassment “is becoming simply one 
variety of employee harassment—and not necessarily the most important variety 
either.”273 In Germany, “feminism aims at social change, and mobbing [law] tends 
to privilege older and more established workers and traditional ideas of social 
status.”274 And in Quebec, “sexual harassment and other forms of discriminatory 
harassment are generally characterized as a sub-set of psychological harassment, 
both formally in legislation and informally in popular discussion of the law.”275 
Also in Israel, “in the analysis of sexual harassment and its harms, this caselaw 
prioritizes dignity over equality so much so that the discriminatory aspects of this 
social practice are no longer part of the legal discourse.”276 These comparative law 
lessons should be considered carefully by proponents of anti-bullying law in the 
United States.277  
c. Legitimating Hostile Structures 
Anti-bullying rules could also legitimate the structural dimensions of work that 
result in hostile environments. To see why, it is helpful to take a step back and 
consider two divergent strands of theory on the origins of mobbing: (1) psychology, 
which holds that “mobbing results from the collision of victim personalities and 
abuser personalities,” and (2) organizational theory, which holds that “mobbing is 
the result of a dysfunctional communication pattern.”278 Research has identified 
many other structural causes of bullying—the growth of a service sector economy 
that requires more personal interaction in the form of “emotional labor,” the “siege 
mentality” resulting from increased pressure to provide more goods and services at 
a lower cost in a globalized economy, the decline of unions as “safety valve[s]” for 
resolving disputes, the failure to manage diversity, and the increased reliance on 
contingent workers considered “depersonalized” and “disposable.”279 These 
dynamics are unlikely to be reversed by new legal prohibitions on bullying. 
Advocates of the anti-bullying movement emphasize the psychological model 
                                                                                                                 
 
 272. Id. at 243. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Global Perspectives, supra note 222, at 159. 
 275. Parkes, supra note 225, at 447. 
 276. Rimalt, supra note 230, at 393. It is important to keep in mind, however, that Israel, 
unlike the United States, has afforded “constitutional status” to human dignity but not to 
equality. Id. at 404–05.  
 277. See Friedman & Whitman, supra note 64, at 243 (concluding that the lesson for 
American scholars is that “[w]e may not be able to pursue the goals of dignity without 
sacrificing some or all of the goals of anti-discrimination”).  
 278. Global Perspectives, supra note 222, at 157. 
 279. Yamada, Phenomenon, supra note 60, at 485–91; see also Nathan A. Bowling & 
Terry A. Beehr, Workplace Harassment from the Victim’s Perspective: A Theoretical Model 
and Meta-Analysis, 91 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 998, 1005 (2006).  
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almost exclusively.280 The psychological literature on bullying takes an 
individualized approach to the problem—identifying victims and perpetrators—
rather than looking for structural or systemic causes.281 Legal prohibitions based on 
the psychological model would shift the blame from corporate and economic 
structures to a few bad apples. 
4. Dilution: Swallowing Sexual Harassment 
Anti-bullying rules would expand the class of potential harassment plaintiffs. 
They would also make it easier for plaintiffs to recover, because those plaintiffs 
would not have to establish proof that the harassment was “because of sex” (or 
otherwise discriminatory). But expansion of sexual harassment doctrine to include 
nondiscriminatory hostile work environments could also risk trivializing the harms 
of discrimination and diluting protections.  
The very rubric of bullying implies that the problem is trivial. It evokes the 
schoolyard and the problems of children.282 Anti-bullying advocates may have 
chosen the wrong mantra for their movement. Indeed, there is no consensus on 
whether the phenomenon should be called abuse, bullying, mobbing, moral 
harassment, psychological harassment, generic harassment, or something else.283 
The term “mobbing” sounds foreign and animalistic,284 and “harassment” risks 
association with sexual harassment and identity politics. The concept of 
“offensiveness” sounds like political correctness and the idea of “incivility” sounds 
like the standard of an age gone by.285 
Many stories of purported mobbing evoke not sympathy but impatience about 
overly sensitive victims overreacting to ordinary office politics.286 Cultural 
                                                                                                                 
 
 280. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, WORKPLACE BULLYING INSTITUTE, 
http://www.workplacebullying.org/faq.html (defining bullying as “a laser-focused, 
systematic campaign of interpersonal destruction” by a bully against a victim that “has 
nothing to do with work itself”).  
 281. Parkes, supra note 225, at 450. 
 282. On the other hand, even school bullying is now considered by some to be a serious 
threat as the cause of a number of teenage suicides. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, What Really 
Happened to Phoebe Prince?, SLATE (July 20, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2260952/ 
entry/2260953 (providing a complicated account of a high-school student’s suicide, by 
contrast to the public’s rush to deem the cause of the tragedy to be simple “bullying”).  
 283. See Loraleigh Keashly & Karen Jagatic, By Any Other Name: American 
Perspectives on Workplace Bullying, in BULLYING AND EMOTIONAL ABUSE IN THE 
WORKPLACE 31, 31–33 (Ståle Einarsen et al. eds., 2003).  
 284. Mobbing may also invoke the lynch mob—helpful if one sees the harm of 
workplace bullying as severe, but insulting if one sees the comparison to race-motivated 
murder as trivializing. See Coleman, supra note 8, at 54–55 (making the comparison to a 
lynch mob). 
 285. See Abrams, supra note 254, at 1184–85 & n.92. 
 286. See Coleman, supra note 8, 57–58 (“Perhaps unsurprisingly, the concept [of 
mobbing] struggles against an accusation of triviality—as most of us routinely endure 
varieties of social aggression or insult, of course, and it is sometimes difficult to discern 
when inevitable workplace conflicts reach the level of psychological destruction needed to 
qualify as mobbing.”). 
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differences may be at work. Americans seem to care more about inequality than 
indignity. To Americans, the concept of dignity seems vague and subjective.287 For 
example, as one Swedish individual said of mobbing: “‘If everybody else leaves the 
coffee room when you walk in, that’s a violation of your dignity, and the law 
should do something about it.’”288 To thick-skinned Americans, this sounds 
ridiculous.289 Of course, an isolated incident of this sort would not be actionable 
under the Healthy Workplace Bill,290 but the risk of frivolous lawsuits or legal 
threats could undermine public support for the law.291  
Remedial efforts may be diluted: 
This is not simply an abstract point but an issue with ramifications for 
public education, legal enforcement, and private efforts at prevention. 
The public will better understand the need for concerted enforcement 
efforts, and employers will better comprehend the need for strong 
affirmative obligations of prevention and response, if they understand 
that they are remedying a longstanding, often entrenched problem [such 
as gender discrimination].292 
Dilution is a problem that can be limited through statutory design. For example, the 
Healthy Workplace Bill would not involve state administrative agencies in deciding 
claims and, therefore, would not strain existing state agencies.293 However, the new 
cause of action would increase the caseload of courts and the workload of state 
                                                                                                                 
 
 287. See Friedman & Whitman, supra note 64, at 267–68 (explaining that “[t]he 
continental countries are places where high-status persons used to lord it over their inferiors 
in insulting and degrading ways,” giving rise to the European principle of dignity for all 
workers, while U.S. law is driven by a different “evil of the past”—slavery—and so, in the 
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 288. Id. at 264 (emphasis in original) (quoting Interview with Jonas Alberg, 
Arbetslivsinstitutet, Stockholm).  
 289. See, e.g., Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1250 
(M.D. Ala. 2001) (“[I]n our pluralist society, no employee can expect the rough and tumble 
professional world to completely accommodate his or her private sense of decency, civility, 
and morality.”). 
 290. Even in Sweden, this type of behavior would probably not qualify as mobbing 
unless it was repeated. Sweden’s Ordinance on Victimization at Work defines 
“victimization” as “recurrent reprehensible or distinctly negative actions which are directed 
against individual employees.” 1 § ORDINANCE OF THE SWEDISH NATIONAL BOARD OF 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH CONTAINING PROVISIONS ON MEASURES AGAINST 
VICTIMIZATION AT WORK (Statute Book of the Swedish National Board of Occupational 
Safety and Health [AFS] 1993:17) (Swed.). It does not create a cause of action for aggrieved 
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Id. § 4. 
 291. One scholar argues that an anti-bullying statute has the potential to “weaken[] the 
entire field” of antidiscrimination law. Corbett, supra note 8, at 144.  
 292. Abrams, supra note 254, at 1187. 
 293. Yamada, Crafting, supra note 60, at 504–05. 
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agencies called upon to issue guidances to interpret the new statute. Public 
education and employer initiatives could also be diluted.294  
Anti-bullying rules may also risk watering down sexual harassment doctrine. 
This depends on how the harms are conceptualized. There could be three ways to 
conceptualize the overlap in definitions between bullying and hostile environment 
sexual harassment. The first conception would be that all dignitary harms are 
coterminous with gender discrimination.295 A second view is that gender 
discrimination is a subset of bullying.296 This view could be the basis for a “hate 
bullying” paradigm in which sexual harassment would be considered a more 
offensive class of bullying.297 A third view is that the phenomena may have a 
segment of overlap but certain distinct features.  
Even if the paradigm is the third view, principles developed in mobbing law 
may drift into sexual harassment law, and vice versa, until the result is the first 
view—that sexual harassment melts into bullying.298 Anti-bullying rules are 
generally less restrictive than sexual harassment rules. First, in Europe, bullying 
must be repeated and take place over a long period of time, while sexual 
harassment may be isolated.299 In the United States, a hostile work environment 
                                                                                                                 
 
 294. Employers might add anti-bullying training to the now ubiquitous sexual harassment 
trainings, but the efficacy of such sessions is unproven in any event. See THERESA M. 
BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 155–57 (2005); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with 
Sledgehammers: The Questionable Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by 
the Legal Profession, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147 (2001). 
 295. Although this conception is not expressly advocated by any scholars, some come 
very close in describing the gendered origins of bullying: bullying is aggression, aggression 
is masculine, and therefore bullying is gendered. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 32, at 1232. 
 296. See Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 63 (suggesting this diagram). 
 297. Yamada, Phenomenon, supra note 60, at 530; see also Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 
54–55; id. at 39–44, 54 (arguing that, in some tort cases, courts treated the discriminatory 
context “as an exacerbating factor when assessing the severity of workplace harassment of 
women”). But see Parkes, supra note 225, at 453 n.127 (concluding that such proposals 
would “not resolve the concern that the systemic factors that contribute to workplace 
harassment will go unaddressed”). 
 298. For example, when France enacted its moral harassment law, it also amended its 
sexual harassment law in the interest of consistency. Abigail C. Saguy, International 
Crossways: Traffic in Sexual Harassment Policy, 9 EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 249, 264 (2002). 
That amendment expanded the definition of sexual harassment to include harassment by 
coworkers as well as superiors. Id. Although in the French case, the drift resulted in more 
expansive protections, there is a risk of contracted protections as well. Note that France is a 
civil law country; the development of civil law may not parallel the evolution of common 
law.  
 299. See Lorho & Hilp, supra note 69, at 9–10. The Healthy Workplace Act would limit 
actionable isolated conduct to an “especially severe and egregious act.” Yamada, Crafting, 
supra note 60, at 498. Similarly, Quebec’s law proscribes “[a] single serious incidence of 
such behaviour that has a lasting harmful effect on an employee.” Act Respecting Labour 
Standards, R.S.Q. 2002, c. N-1.1, ch. IV, div. V.2, § 81.18 ¶ 2 (Que., Can.), 
http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/laws/stat/rsq-c-n-1.1/84271/rsq-c-n-1.1.html#history. The 
harmful effect of the incidence “must be felt over time.” COMMISSION DES NORMES DU 
TRAVAIL, INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT RESPECTING LABOUR STANDARDS, ITS REGULATIONS 
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may be “severe or pervasive.”300 Second, the Healthy Workplace Act requires that 
the victim prove the aggressor had a mental state of “malice,”301 whereas 
harassment law requires only a showing that the harassment was because of sex or 
another protected characteristic.302 Third, the damages available to a mobbing 
victim would be more limited than those available under Title VII.303 And finally, 
bullying policies are more likely to give victims options of in-house grievance 
procedures, mediation, or arbitration, rather than access to courts. Should these 
limitations drift from bullying law into Title VII harassment law, antidiscrimination 
protections would be watered down. Due to the antipathy of the judiciary and 
business community toward workplace regulations, I predict it is more likely that 
Title VII harassment rules will be watered down than that bullying rules will be 
strengthened. 
 
*** 
 
In sum, although there is not yet enough empirical research on these questions to 
reach firm conclusions, the available scholarship suggests that anti-bullying rules 
would not have significant advantages over sexual harassment prohibitions in terms 
of avoiding essentialism or backlash. And anti-bullying rules are likely to impede 
antidiscrimination goals by obscuring the connections between harassment and 
patterns of subordination, and diluting the scope of harassment prohibitions. 
B. Work-Life Accommodations 
1. Essentialism: Defining the Balanced Worker 
 
a. Moving Away from Family 
Work-life policy has advantages over work-family policy in avoiding 
essentialism. Balancing the work-family equation is the new feminine mystique.304 
                                                                                                                 
AND THE NATIONAL HOLIDAY ACT 66 (2010), available at http://www.cnt.gouv.qc.ca/ 
fileadmin/pdf/publications/c_0111_a.pdf. 
 300. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). Careful drafting could avoid 
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 301. Yamada, Crafting, supra note 60, at 501. 
 302. See id. at 497. 
 303. Compare id. at 504 (proposing a bill that would provide that where an employer’s 
conduct “did not culminate in a negative employment decision, its liability for damages for 
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 304. See Moran, supra note 98, at 288 (implying that the “work-family” rubric suggests 
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Finding the optimal arrangement—just the right amount of work and just the right 
amount of family—has become the successful woman’s imperative.305 Stay-at-
home moms are blamed for women’s inequality in paid labor, while workaholic 
women are told their lives are meaningless without children.306 Although it is 
gender neutral, the unstated premise of the “work-family accommodation model” is 
that work should be more flexible so that we women can “balance paid work with 
‘our’ family responsibilities.”307 The paradigmatic beneficiary of this policy is the 
harried mother working the second shift who “talk[s] about sleep the way a hungry 
person talks about food.”308  
Work-life policy may better avoid such gender stereotypes. Universal protection 
would reflect that inflexible workplaces are not problematic just for women or 
parents, but rather are harmful to everyone.309 Making flexible arrangements 
available to all workers does not require employers or the judiciary to determine 
whether workers have legitimate family relationships or caretaking needs.310 Work-
life policies avoid generalizations about any particular person’s life goals or the 
form “family” should take. Workers would be able to shape their careers to 
accommodate any variety of life pursuits: caretaking, military service, volunteering, 
education, or watching reality television shows.311 Work-life policies do not 
privilege motherhood, parenting, or family over other life pursuits.  
Despite these advantages, work-life policies continue to exclude many workers 
and invite new forms of essentialism. 
b. Those Left Out by Work-Life Balance 
The work-life mantra is not all-inclusive. The work-life concept re-centers 
workplace norms around those who desire balance between at-work and after-work 
activities, potentially to the detriment of those for whom work is life (i.e., 
                                                                                                                 
the goal is for “women to follow a script of combining work and family”).  
 305. Single women without children are rendered invisible by this norm, id., while 
mothers who have “too many” children become spectacles, see Jessica Grose, Extreme 
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Duggar, and Octomom, DOUBLEX.COM (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.doublex.com/section/ 
arts/extreme-moms-and-why-we-love-them. 
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 309. See Ryan & Kossek, supra note 128, at 298. 
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Labor, American Time Use Surveys—2009 Results 2 (June 22, 2010), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus.pdf. 
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“workaholics”), and those for whom life is work (i.e., the prototypical 
overstretched woman in the “sandwich generation” caring for both elderly parents 
and young children). Generation X workers may be more concerned about work-
life balance than baby boomers.312 And some members of the next generation of 
workers want to deconstruct the divide between work and life.313 The “work-life 
balance” metaphor suggests that every individual must work to maintain the two 
separate and opposing spheres at equilibrium, rather than finding overlaps and 
synergies between roles.314  
Policies that allow workers to spend less time in the workplace in exchange for 
lower wages are helpful only to high earners,315 who are more likely to be white 
and male. Those who need more wage work to support themselves and their 
families have little use for such work-life accommodations. For example, one 
work-life accommodation for retail workers allows them to “claim availability” by 
declaring the times they can work.316 But in doing so, they risk receiving fewer 
hours.317 These workers are forced into the choice between “working preferred 
hours” and “working enough hours.”318  
And although “flexibility” may be good for high-income workers when it is a 
perk intended to improve recruiting, retention, and productivity, “flexibility” has an 
entirely different meaning for low-income workers.319 Many low-wage workers 
need the opposite of flexibility—they need predictable schedules, rather than 
schedules given on little notice, so they can make arrangements for childcare and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 312. CATALYST, THE NEXT GENERATION: TODAY’S PROFESSIONALS, TOMORROW’S 
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 313. See Forum: Men and Marriage (C-SPAN2 television broadcast Oct. 19, 2009), 
available at http://www.c-spanarchives.org/program/id/214130 (held by the Center for 
American Progress) (statement of Courtney Martin, at 19:02) (“In my generation . . . this 
kind of work slash life language doesn’t even make sense, because we want our work to be 
part of our lives and we want our lives to work.”). See generally ARLIE RUSSELL 
HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK 
(1997). 
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 315. See Selmi & Cahn, supra note 88, at 8. 
 316. Susan J. Lambert, Making a Difference for Hourly Employees, in WORK-LIFE 
POLICIES, supra note 9, at 169, 177. 
 317. Id.  
 318. Id. 
 319. See Kerry Rittich, Rights, Risk, and Reward: Governance Norms in the 
International Order and the Problem of Precarious Work, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN, 
AND THE NEW ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 31, 31; Schultz, supra note 16, at 1220–21.  
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other plans.320 Telecommuting is touted as a work-life solution, but there are two 
tracks of telecommuters: (1) predominantly male elite professionals for whom 
telecommuting is “a benefit that gives workers increased choice, flexibility, and 
autonomy,” and (2) predominantly female clerical workers for whom 
telecommuting “result[s] in decreased pay, benefits, autonomy, job security, and 
advancement opportunities.”321  
The international experience suggests that work-life solutions are often enacted 
with compromises that disadvantage the economically powerless. For example, 
when France implemented a thirty-five-hour workweek, working-class and 
immigrant women benefited the least from the law, because companies demanded 
larger tradeoffs for the reform in terms of being able to choose work hours and 
restrain wages.322 Some workers were required to work “yo-yo shift patterns” in 
which “[s]hifts were shortened but multiplied so that working patterns fitted in with 
management ideologies of permanent availability while workers hung around in 
between shifts.”323  
c. The Employer Discretion Double Bind 
Work-life reformers face a double bind. To best avoid essentialism, every 
worker must be able to customize his or her job. Some psychologists define an 
“inclusive workplace” as one that “values individual and intergroup differences in 
the primacy of work versus other life roles” and “supports variation in domestic 
backgrounds and in blending work and nonwork demands.”324  
It is one that equally values those who believe leaving work early to 
attend a child’s soccer game is critical as well as those who do not mind 
missing games, and for those who use all their available paid time off to 
train for a triathlon as well as those who feel personal time is reserved 
for family emergencies.325  
For these psychologists, every worker should be able to negotiate the shape of his 
or her career. 
But U.S. workplaces are not structured to allow radical customization. 
Customization of jobs is at the discretion of the employer. And the more an 
employer has discretion to approve or deny flexible work arrangements, the more 
opportunities for essentialism, as each supervisor brings his or her own views on 
the normative case for accommodation.326 When mothers want to work from home, 
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supervisors may deny the request based on the stereotype that working mothers are 
likely to be distracted by their children.327 On the other hand, supervisors are more 
likely to agree to reductions in work hours for female than for male employees, 
perhaps based on stereotypical assumptions that women should engage in more 
caretaking.328 Other supervisors may be more willing to support traditional 
families, defined to exclude those with elder care responsibilities, single people, or 
same-sex couples. If only mothers or childcare needs are accommodated, the 
transition from “work-family” to “work-life” is simply a change in labels rather 
than the loosening of essentialist ideas.329  
2. Backlash: Creating a New “Mommy Track” 
Work-life accommodations used by all workers may appear to avoid identity 
politics—benefiting men, women, parents, and nonparents alike—without 
stigmatizing their beneficiaries.330 Some experience bears this out. Best Buy’s 
corporate headquarters implemented a successful program called “results-only 
work environment,” or “ROWE,”331 to get rid of fixed hours for all employees, 
                                                                                                                 
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 108–11 (2003). In 
the alternative, a legal regime could provide a detailed list of all the activities for which 
leave should be required (i.e., breastfeeding, school plays, children’s sporting events, etc.). 
Cf. Arnow-Richman, supra note 9, at 1090–91 (describing the “incredible breadth and 
detail” of the recent Military Leave Amendments to the FMLA which “require employers to 
provide FMLA leave to employees experiencing a ‘qualifying exigency’ as a result of a 
family member serving or called to active duty in the Armed Forces”). But such a list would 
reflect essentialist notions of the core activities of caretaking. Moreover, “it is unclear how 
law makers would extend laws like school involvement legislation to provide workers with 
the requisite flexibility to accommodate all of the particular needs of their families without 
creating a highly complex and unwieldy system of rules.” Id.  
 327. Arnow-Richman, supra note 9, at 1104. Although, in theory, such a failure to 
accommodate would be actionable discrimination, it would be difficult to prove that the 
action was motivated by bias rather than a legitimate business justification, particularly if the 
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assessment is “highly optimistic.” Id. at 1112–13. 
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Studying a Corporate Work-Time Policy Initiative, in WORK-LIFE POLICIES, supra note 9, at 
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“replacing institutionalized clockworks with an emphasis on the quality of job 
done.”332 The program’s creators considered it essential to their success that they 
deliberately avoided any reference to their project as “work-family,” “‘mother’ 
friendly or even ‘family’ friendly.”333 Similarly, many medical practices have been 
able to provide flexible work arrangements by framing the initiative as a set of 
“broad developments that address a wider range of worker and organizational needs 
beyond those linked to family.”334 A historical example: by expanding the FMLA 
from family leave to medical leave, supporters were able to increase the policy’s 
appeal across the political spectrum and achieve passage of the bill.335 There seems 
to be more support for the argument that universalism avoids backlash in the work-
life context than in the harassment context. 
But in many workplaces, even universally available flexible work arrangements 
and leave policies are regarded as special accommodations for caretakers or 
“mommy tracks.”336 Although both men and women express concern about work-
life issues, flexibility remains seen as a “women’s issue.”337 Employees, 
particularly men, fear that using flexible arrangements will signal that they lack 
commitment to the job and hinder their career advancement.338 A study of the 
medical profession found that increased flexibility goes hand-in-hand with 
increased bureaucratization.339 This is because the larger the practice and the more 
standardized the procedures, the less any one physician is viewed as 
indispensable.340 Women and parents are more likely to work in such practices, but 
at the cost of autonomy, prestige, and income.341 This caused one researcher to ask, 
“Does gaining flexibility mean losing the professional ‘calling’?”342 
One way to avoid the “mommy track” problem is to mandate work-life balance 
for everyone. An example: to increase gender parity, many scholars advocate 
mandatory paid maternity and paternity leave.343 Another example: some 
                                                                                                                 
97, 103. 
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 334. See Forrest Briscoe, The Design of Work as a Key Driver of Work-Life Flexibility 
for Professionals, in WORK-LIFE POLICIES, supra note 9, at 83, 89–91. 
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 336. See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 127, at 111 (“‘Mommy tracks’ . . . ask women to 
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family policies may appear less pernicious. But if they stigmatize parental involvement, both 
involved mothers and fathers are disadvantaged.” (emphasis in original)); Kelly & Moen, 
supra note 126; Schultz, supra note 9, at 1955–56. 
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DIFFERENT REALITIES 29–30 (2004) (studying Fortune 1000 executives directly below the 
CEO level); Gerkovich, supra note 123, at 276. 
 338. See Kelly & Moen, supra note 126, at 490 (summarizing research). 
 339. See Briscoe, supra note 334, at 86–87. 
 340. Id.  
 341. Id. See generally CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, CARROLL SERON, BONNIE OGLENSKY & 
ROBERT SAUTÉ, THE PART-TIME PARADOX: TIME NORMS, PROFESSIONAL LIVES, FAMILY, AND 
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 342. Briscoe, supra note 334, at 89. 
 343. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1172, 1180 (2010); 
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employers, rather than giving religious employees the Sabbath off, close up shop 
for all workers.344 But still, the focus is on accommodating parents or religious 
preferences. And while these solutions may work for homogenous workforces (all 
young parents, all members of certain religions), they will not work as well for 
heterogeneous workforces consisting of people with varying caregiving 
responsibilities, religious orientations, and other extracurricular needs and 
interests.345 
Universal workplace accommodations may be just as likely as caretaking 
accommodations to shift costs onto disadvantaged groups. Research suggests that 
managers and coworkers assume that the users of flexible work arrangements are a 
drain on productivity, whether or not they really are.346 If men as well as women 
began taking advantage of work-life policies, it might stem cost shifting in the form 
of hiring discrimination against women. But to the extent that only women use 
workplace accommodations, the costs of absences are likely to be shifted onto other 
women.347 Because many workplaces are segregated, with certain employers hiring 
almost all women,348 women are likely to bear any costs of maternity leave or other 
employer-funded mandates targeted at women.349 And regardless of what group the 
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fathers, in which both parents are allocated thirteen total months of paid leave, but at least 
two of those months can only be used by fathers. Katrin Bennhold, In Sweden, Men Can 
Have It All, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010, at A6; see also Arielle Horman Grill, Comment, The 
Myth of Unpaid Family Leave: Can the United States Implement a Paid Leave Policy Based 
on the Swedish Model?, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 373, 375 (1996). 
 344. See, e.g., Adam Goldman, Ultra-Orthodox Jews Hit It Big with Cameras, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Dec. 1, 2005, at 13A (“[B&H Photo-Video] employs 
800 to 900 people, many of them religious Jews. The store closes each Friday afternoon until 
Sunday in observance of the Sabbath, and on about a half-dozen Jewish holidays each 
year.”); Why We’re Closed on Sundays, CHICK-FIL-A, http://www.chick-fil-
a.com/Company/Highlights-Sunday (“Our founder, Truett Cathy, made the decision to close 
on Sundays in 1946 . . . . He believes that all franchised Chick-fil-A Operators and 
Restaurant employees should have an opportunity to rest, spend time with family and 
friends, and worship if they choose to do so.”). 
 345. A prejudiced employer could exploit preferences for such schedules for 
discriminatory purposes. See Jonah Gelbach, Jonathan Klick & Lesley Wexler, Passive 
Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense to Pay Too Little?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 797 
(2009). 
 346. See Ellen Ernst Kossek, Alison E. Barber & Deborah Winters, Using Flexible 
Schedules in the Managerial World: The Power of Peers, 38 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 33, 40 
(1999) (surveying managers, and concluding that “productivity concerns are most strongly 
associated with use of flextime; slightly, but significantly related to use of leaves; and not 
related to use of part time work”).  
 347. Case, supra note 9, at 1756. 
 348. See Boushey, supra note 23, at 39–40. 
 349. Case, supra note 9, at 1757 (“[I]n female-dominated jobs, like those so many 
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mandate is targeted at, “[e]mployers may shift costs disproportionately to 
secondary labor market workers (those who are easily replaceable because their 
human capital is basically irrelevant) in an effort to avoid cutting compensation of 
incumbent primary employees (those whose human capital is necessary to their 
job).”350  
In a heterogeneous workforce, work-life policies can be polarizing when one 
worker’s life conflicts with another’s. When flexibility is conceptualized as 
accommodation, it comes to be seen as “a favor or a perk” rather than a “mutual 
benefit.”351 What if Jane wants the afternoon off to volunteer to plant trees, while 
John wants to leave early for his daughter’s soccer practice? “Work/family issues 
are inevitably personal: people feel as if they are defending their own life choices in 
a context where no one feels entirely comfortable because everyone is caught in the 
clash of social ideals.”352 Managers may seem to apply different standards, causing 
a perception that the organization is unjust.353 Some advocates claim that jealousy 
and backlash can be avoided if managers communicate and apply objective 
parameters for use of work-life policies.354 But the more rigid the parameters, the 
less likely the policies are to meet the needs of a diverse workforce. And employers 
are hesitant to adopt formal policies for fear of creating legal “entitlements.”355 
3. Assimilation: Increasing the Gendered Division of Labor 
The critique of assimilationist reform strategies has the most force in the work-
life context.356 Work-life balance problems are not gender neutral. Women do the 
                                                                                                                 
women occupy, ‘the existing employees’ on whom the ‘excess work’ resulting from 
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such as “cross-training, setting core hours, and modes for communication and back-up 
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 355. Erin L. Kelly & Alexandra Kalev, Managing Flexible Work Arrangements in US 
Organizations: Formalized Discretion or ‘A Right to Ask,’ 4 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 379, 382, 
394 (2006). 
 356. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 4–8 (2000). 
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lion’s share of caregiving, and they are penalized for it in the labor market.357 In 
contrast to policies that encourage caregiving, policies that accommodate all life 
pursuits equally will confer the greatest advantage in labor markets on workers 
with no domestic responsibilities, in other words, those who assimilate to 
traditional male norms. Under open-ended rules, women will have incentives to 
take leave to better engage in caregiving, while men will have incentives to use 
flexible work arrangements to better engage in paid work. The result is to 
legitimate the gendered division of labor. 
a. Constrained Choices 
Work-life accommodations are premised on a universalistic liberty ideal: 
employers should respect all workers’ choices in how to combine life and paid 
work. But for good reasons, feminists have criticized recent generations of 
scholarship for fetishizing choice.358 As Vicki Schultz has put it: “workplace 
flexibility programs and their advocates assume that the rhythms and dynamics of 
family life, and any patterns of sex segregation that are associated with flexible 
work options, are exogenous to workplace arrangements.”359 Workers are not 
radically free to make choices, such as whether to stay home with children or seek 
employment,360 whether to work as nurses or plumbers,361 or whether to dress 
demurely or provocatively on the job.362 Such choices are constrained and 
sometimes wholly determined by the options available in the home and workplace. 
The very fact that workers face such choices is not a natural feature of the social 
landscape, but rather a situation that has resulted from the intersection of gender 
norms with legal, political, and economic structures. For example, the so-called 
“opt-out revolution”363 of professional women leaving their jobs to stay home with 
children was more about mothers being pushed out of inflexible workplaces than 
about mothers being pulled back home by biological urges (to the extent any such 
trend existed).364 Likewise, men do not avoid housework and childcare due to 
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Empirical support for any “opt-out” trend is lacking. See Heather Boushey, “Opting Out?” 
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intractable biological inclinations—between 1975 and 1998, men’s unpaid work 
increased by an hour a day.365 
b. Flexibility for Men; Leave for Women 
Women have fewer choices in work scheduling than men. Women are less likely 
than men to have access to flexible work schedules, even in the same industries.366 
Research suggests this is likely because women hold fewer elite positions.367 Many 
organizations have formal policies referring to “legal ideals of fairness and 
consistency,” and supervisors look to these policies when granting requests for 
flexible work arrangements.368 But those policies are written to safeguard 
managerial discretion “and avoid creating ‘new entitlements.’”369 In practice, 
managers offer flexible work arrangements to reward those employees viewed as 
good performers—employees with bargaining power in the labor market who 
might find new jobs if not accommodated.370 “Ethnic and racial minorities, and 
women, especially mothers, may find it more difficult to be recognized as a ‘high 
performer’” in this system.371 However, women are more likely to have access to 
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one type of flexible work arrangement—work-at-home arrangements372—perhaps 
because such arrangements facilitate their increased caregiving relative to men.373 
By failing to connect the problems that workers have in integrating work and 
life with larger patterns of gender subordination, work-life policies fail to address 
inequality. One problem is that men don’t take leave as often as women.374 
Research suggests men want to take leave, but the economic incentives are stacked 
against it, since men are likely to earn higher wages than their female partners.375 
Additionally, in many workplaces, men are explicitly or implicitly discouraged 
from taking leave.376 The effect of women’s disproportionate use of leave is to 
reinforce labor specialization—women develop better caretaking skills and lose 
ground in paid labor markets during their time off, while men fail to develop 
caretaking skills and gain ground in paid labor markets.377  
And when men do use work-life accommodations, it does not necessarily 
decrease women’s caretaking burdens. Men are more likely to use flexible work 
scheduling so that they can work when they are most productive, while women are 
more likely to use flexible work scheduling to accommodate caretaking.378 When 
France implemented a thirty-five-hour workweek, the number of men with two jobs 
increased.379 Joan Williams offers the anecdote that when a law school where she 
worked in the 1980s gave mothers and fathers a semester’s leave for the birth of a 
child, “Women used the leave for child care, while one man went to Mardi Gras 
during his leave (without the baby) and another used his leave to write a law review 
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article.”380 Some research suggests that “fathers step in to assist with housework 
only when mothers are not available.”381 Consistent with this premise, another 
study found that men who take advantage of leave policies engage in larger shares 
of the types of repetitive and time-sensitive housekeeping traditionally performed 
by women, like cooking, cleaning, and laundry.382 The same is not true, however, 
of men who take advantage of flexible work arrangements.383 The reason may be 
related to research demonstrating that married men who work shifts that do not 
overlap with their wives’ (in other words, men who are home alone) do a larger 
share of the housework than other men.384 Thus, policies that create incentives for 
men (or both parents, to put it neutrally) to take leave may better undermine the 
gendered division of labor than generic workplace accommodations. 
c. Legitimating Inflexible Work Structures 
Giving certain workers accommodations as exceptions to the norm of inflexible 
work legitimates inflexible work structures. Many workplaces are still centered 
around the norm of the husband earning the “family wage” while the wife stays 
home, even though only sixteen percent of American families fit this mold.385 The 
ideal worker is one who can devote absolute attention to work.386 Work-life 
initiatives that look like special benefits “may inure management to the real sources 
of work-life imbalance”—“how jobs are designed, how work is coordinated, how 
organizational rewards are determined, and how the culture supports or hinders 
work-life balance.”387  
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Another problem is the phenomenon described as the “time divide”—employers 
have incentives to overwork salaried employees and underwork hourly 
employees.388 Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, employers are not required to 
pay managerial, salaried, and professional workers for overtime,389 creating 
incentives for employers to hire fewer of such workers and overwork them.390 
Employer benefit plans generally cover only full-time workers.391 To avoid paying 
costly benefits to additional workers, employers have incentives to create part-time, 
contingent, or contract positions.392 The result is a situation in which men are more 
likely to have difficulty avoiding overwork and women are more likely to have 
difficulty finding sufficient paid work.393 Individual accommodations that allow 
certain workers to “maneuver around workplace norms that create gender 
inequality” detract focus from this structural problem.394 
Legitimation results both from universal accommodations and those targeted at 
caregivers or women. However, if elite workers, who are more likely to be men, 
benefit from accommodations like flexibility that do not increase their caregiving 
relative to women, they will have no incentive to support policies to benefit all 
workers.395  
4. Dilution: Undermining Protections for Care 
Expanding work-family policies to work-life policies may trivialize the needs of 
caretakers and water down protections like parental leave. The trivialization 
problem goes hand-in-hand with any solution that takes an agnostic view on which 
life pursuits merit workplace accommodation. Although employers may find 
caregiving responsibilities good reasons to allow worker flexibility, manicures, 
fantasy football, and tropical vacations garner less sympathy. These “frivolous” 
reasons for seeking flexible work arrangements threaten to undermine the entire 
project, which is why advocates use examples of life pursuits like military service, 
community volunteering, and disaster preparedness training. These pursuits mimic 
childrearing in that they contribute to the reproduction and preservation of 
American life and culture. But many work-life proposals would equally protect the 
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worker who just wants to spend more time watching television. If a work-life 
policy leads to widespread freeriding and abuse, the entire endeavor is at risk. 
Indeed, support has now waned for leave in general because the FMLA is utilized 
for many short, personal sick leaves that employers perceive as costly and 
illegitimate.396  
Expanding leave may water down protections for caregivers. If all employees 
were entitled to request leave for any reason, and employers were not be permitted 
to inquire into a worker’s reasons for taking leave, then a worker who needed the 
day off to take an elderly parent to a doctor’s appointment would have the same 
chance of getting that accommodation as a worker who wants the day off to go 
fishing.397 Or maybe neither worker will get the day off. Some employers have 
reduced paid maternity leaves as family responsibilities discrimination litigation 
has grown.398 One scholar argues: “If employers are required to treat women the 
same as men, and to treat people with caregiving responsibilities no differently 
from all other workers, the easiest way for employers to comply with 
antidiscrimination law is to offer nothing to both men and women, especially in a 
tough economy.”399  
 
*** 
 
In sum, based on available empirical research on different forms of work-life 
accommodation, it seems likely that universal accommodations would have some 
advantages in terms of avoiding essentialism and backlash, but would not eliminate 
the problems. And universal accommodation requirements risk obscuring the 
connections between the lack of workplace flexibility for caretakers and the 
gendered division of labor, and undermining all workplace flexibility projects 
through dilution. 
IV. TOWARD A MORE INCLUSIVE WORKPLACE 
A. Lessons for Other Universalizing Projects 
This analysis demonstrates that universalized protections may fail to advance 
equality. While at first it seemed that universal rules would avoid essentialism and 
backlash, a closer examination reveals that packaging reforms as benefits to “all 
workers” does not necessarily strip them of their associations with identity groups. 
Additionally, when they are characterized as subsuming protections against 
discrimination, universal protections run the risk of evisceration-by-assimilation of 
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feminism as a political project, and dilution-by-expansion of antidiscrimination as a 
redistributive project.  
Although in theory universal protections should avoid essentialism, this is not 
necessarily the case. It is true that universal solutions do not revolve around 
identity claims. But like traditional civil rights protections, universalized 
protections are fixated on individuals—changing people rather than workplaces. 
Universal protections may open new avenues for enforcement of stereotypes and 
generalizations, for example, about what sort of conduct is bullying and what sort 
of workers deserve accommodation. Courts, employers, and the public may import 
essentialist notions in interpreting, enforcing, and understanding universal laws. 
While sexual harassment laws imagine women as imperiled victims, anti-bullying 
laws imagine them as dragon-ladies. While family-leave policies imagine women 
as needy mothers, work-life policies imagine them walking a tightrope. It would 
not be strategic to embrace any of these essentialist notions. 
Universal solutions do not necessarily avoid the backlash resulting from identity 
politics. To be sure, moving beyond equality to universalism can be politically 
savvy.400 Crafting solutions that are universally available may reveal the value of 
reforms for more workers. However, whether this approach works to quell political 
dissensus will depend on the strength of the competing interests at stake. For 
example, religious conservatives who oppose extension of anti-harassment rules to 
harassment based on sexual orientation may also oppose generic anti-harassment 
rules.401 But gay-rights groups may not see the benefit of expending resources on 
the anti-bullying cause. Work-life initiatives may find support from women’s 
groups, but at the cost of becoming “mommy tracks.” 
Universal protections can eviscerate feminist political goals through 
assimilation. Movements for equality risk death by absorption into universalistic 
politics. Antidiscrimination rules require employers to ask, “am I treating anyone 
differently because of gender?” while universal rules require employers to ask, “is 
this workplace too hostile or inflexible?” If the universal rule swallows the 
antidiscrimination rule, the transformative potential of requiring employers and the 
public to scrutinize whether employment decisions are gendered is lost. Rules 
protecting dignity or liberty may end up replicating inequality. The law has trouble 
recognizing indignities to those at the bottom of class hierarchies, for example, 
those who already do “menial” work, or threats to the liberty of those constrained 
by gender norms, for example, couples who “choose” traditional breadwinner-
caregiver family arrangements.402 A theory of universalism that imagines the 
sphere of universal harms as subsuming gendered harms could become part of a 
“post-feminist” political project that either denies the existence of gender inequality 
                                                                                                                 
 
 400. See Fineman, supra note 12, at 17 (“The realization that disadvantage is produced 
independent of racial and gender biases in many—but of course not all—instances provides 
an important political tool. Mobilizing around the concept of shared, inevitable vulnerability 
may allow us to more easily build coalitions . . . .”). 
 401. See supra notes 240–42 and accompanying text. 
 402. This is not to say that couples who organize their work and family lives according to 
the traditional model suffer from some form of false consciousness, just that we cannot 
determine whether they would have made the same “choices” if they had been presented 
with different options for combining career and family. 
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or chalks it up to personal choices rather than economic and political structures. 
Compliance efforts that focus on weeding the bad seeds out of the workplace or 
creating new tracks for non-ideal workers may mask deeper problems. 
Finally, universal policies have the potential to water down existing protections. 
Cases on the fringe of bullying resemble office politics, and cases on the fringe of 
work-life accommodation resemble free riding. The fringe cases threaten to 
trivialize the entire endeavor and undermine the core of protections. Due to limited 
resources, the requirement that all protections be universal may result in no 
protections at all. 
Yet the disadvantages to universal rules described in Part III of this Article are 
not reasons to completely abandon universalizing projects. To return to Part I of 
this Article: sexual harassment law and family leave policy are tragically 
underinclusive. Cases are hard to win because bias is difficult to prove. Many 
workers are not covered by existing rules, such as those harassed because of sexual 
orientation, physical appearance, or native language, or those with nontraditional 
families or personal lives. The harms of harassment and inflexible work are 
widespread. Why should any worker be required to risk dignity, liberty, health, or 
safety to earn a living?403 Some types of anti-bullying and work-life policies might 
provide recourse to those left out by current laws while avoiding the problematic 
fixation with sex and family.  
B. Reframing the Discussion to Focus on Inclusivity 
There is no tidy solution to the dilemma posed by this Article: that gender issues 
may point to larger problems with the structure of the workplace, but universal 
solutions may create new gender issues. Is there is a way to provide universal 
protection without undermining equality? To minimize the tradeoffs between 
universality and equality, I propose that goals be reframed in terms of making 
workplaces more inclusive.404  
This Article does not conclude that there is nothing to be gained from 
universalist theories or that unhinging legal protections from identities is never a 
good move. There are likely to be cases in which a policy grounded in an identity 
category is so woefully underinclusive, essentialist, and divisive that a universal 
policy would be an improvement regardless of the risks of assimilation and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 403. Cf. Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the 
Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 957–58 (1996) (arguing that affirmative action 
presents “an opportunity to take from the margin to rethink the whole” by asking larger 
questions about the fairness of one-size-fits-all merit-based selection systems for everyone). 
 404. Cf. powell, supra note 22, at 802–03 (proposing “targeted universalism” that would 
be “inclusive of the needs of both the dominant and the marginal groups, but pays particular 
attention to the situation of the marginal group”); Susan Sturm, The Architecture of 
Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 
250 (2006) (supporting a “project of achieving inclusive institutions” that goes beyond 
“eliminating discrimination or even increasing the representation of previously excluded 
groups” to “creat[e] the conditions enabling people of all races and genders to realize their 
capabilities as they understand them”). 
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dilution.405 However, the bullying and work-life examples demonstrate that 
universal moves should be made with caution. Universality and equality can be 
conflicting goals. Universal protections take aim at harms that affect all workers at 
the risk of ignoring how those harms are gendered and how uniform solutions may 
only assist privileged workers. Equality-based protections take aim at harms that 
affect women at the risk of ignoring harms to all workers, expressing essentialist 
notions, and sparking divisive identity politics.  
Inclusiveness is not the same as equality. Equality requires eliminating disparate 
treatment or subordination. Inclusiveness requires constant reconsideration of how 
legal rules and workplace structures exclude certain workers. The inquiry would 
not stop at asking whether men and women are treated the same, but it would also 
ask, for example, why workers aren’t protected against discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, or discrimination based on the intersection of race and 
gender. An inclusive approach would not abandon universalist goals like liberty 
and dignity; rather, it would insist on equal liberty and dignity.406 To insist on bare 
equality of treatment, without reference to other values, is to repeat the mistake of 
the anticlassification paradigm—ignoring the interplay between legal rules and 
status hierarchies.407 It is also to miss the potential of equality norms to spark re-
evaluation of universal standards. Equality-based movements can bring problems to 
light that require that we lift the floor for everyone, rather than simply equalize 
conditions.408 We can “understand[] accommodation as a process of interrogating 
the existing baseline, by focusing on part of the population that was neglected in 
the creation of that baseline, to make changes to that baseline that may affect 
everyone.”409 An inclusive approach would not require blanket rejection of 
protections based on universal norms. Rather, it would not allow universal norms to 
eclipse equality concerns, by requiring careful consideration of potential problems 
such as assimilation and dilution. 
Neither is inclusiveness the same as universality. To make a workplace more 
inclusive, reformers must pay attention not just to the commonalities between 
workers’ problems, but also the differences. Otherwise, the problems of those 
                                                                                                                 
 
 405. One likely example is the recasting of sex trafficking as human trafficking. See 
Chuang, supra note 27.  
 406. Cf. Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional 
Vision, 43 N.E. L. REV. 799, 840 (2009) (explaining how Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional 
“vision encompasses both an equality and a liberty component”). 
 407. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 129, at 13–14 (describing how anticlassification norms 
are implemented along with other norms that may either preserve or dismantle social 
relations). 
 408. Siegel, supra note 406, at 840–41 (arguing for a constitutional vision of equal liberty 
that recognizes “a floor, an irreducible minimum of autonomy that government must accord 
each person regardless of how it treats other persons—a zone of individual freedom into 
which government may not intrude”).  
 409. Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 894 
(2008) (recognizing that a model that “treats disability as a lens through which to see the 
need for universal improvements” risks losing “disabled people and their particular needs . . . 
in the mix” and “[t]he whole idea of accommodation risks dissolving into a general social 
welfare program in which disabled people’s needs matter no more and no less than anyone 
else’s”). 
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disadvantaged by race, gender, class, and other hierarchies are likely to be 
overlooked. Gender subordination will be considered a thing of the past and the 
manner in which gender subordination continues today will become difficult to 
discern. Thus, legal rules must continue to focus on inequality. But not all 
differences can always be accommodated. An approach that aims to increase 
inclusiveness would confront potential costs and tradeoffs rather than attempting to 
take a universal shortcut around difficult debates over recognition of differences in 
the workplace. It would forgo appeals to the universal high ground in favor of 
finding common ground between workers and revealing second- and third-party 
benefits.410 It would reject universal solutions, realizing that achieving greater 
inclusiveness is always an unfinished project.411  
An inclusive approach requires expansion of workplace protections, but not at 
the expense of marginalized and vulnerable workers. Thus, it requires consideration 
not just of the benefits of greater inclusivity, but also critical examination of 
whether universal expansion would have advantages in terms of avoiding 
essentialism and backlash, and disadvantages in terms of assimilation and dilution. 
C. Inclusive Approaches to Harassment and Work-Life Conflicts 
This Part offers some preliminary suggestions for achieving greater 
inclusiveness by eliminating harassment and work-life conflicts. In accord with a 
paradigm of inclusiveness, harassment and work-life conflicts should be addressed 
by solutions that (1) avoid assimilation and dilution by maintaining attention to 
gender and other forms of discrimination, (2) avoid essentialism and identity 
politics by focusing on eliminating discrimination, rather than enforcing particular 
norms about gender, sex, and family, and (3) remedy underinclusiveness by 
gradually expanding protections to other forms of discrimination and 
experimenting with flexible solutions to universal harms.  
The law should continue to focus on discrimination to avoid the assimilation and 
dilution problems. Despite their limitations and problems, civil rights laws have 
been successful in alleviating many of the most harmful forms of discrimination. 
Sexual harassment law has changed cultural norms and eliminated many forms of 
egregious workplace behavior.412 Millions utilize the FMLA’s leave provisions 
every year.413 Plaintiffs have achieved notable successes in litigating family 
                                                                                                                 
 
 410. For a discussion of second- and third-party benefits, see id. at 873–74. 
 411. “[I]nclusiveness is an ideal, an ideal that is impossible to realize, but whose 
unrealizability nevertheless governs the way in which a radical democratic project 
proceeds.” Letter from Judith Butler to Ernesto Laclau (May 1995), in The Uses of Equality, 
27 DIACRITICS 3, 4 (Reinaldo Laddaga ed., 1997). A project based on inclusiveness is 
“bound to fail . . . because the various differences that are to be included within the polity are 
not given in advance.” Id. Those differences are always “in the process of being formulated 
and elaborated.” Id.  
 412. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, The Rights of Remedies: Collective Accountings for and 
Insuring Against the Harms of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
LAW, supra note 47, at 247, 251–52. 
 413. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,042 (Nov. 17, 
2008) (amending 29 C.F.R. pt. 825 (2008)) (estimating that seven million workers took 
1284 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:1219 
 
responsibilities discrimination cases.414 In anthropological terms, these laws have 
created awareness of discrimination by allowing plaintiffs to “name” the harms 
they suffered, “blame” their employers, and “claim” legal remedies.415 Grouping 
these well recognized forms of discrimination together with nondiscriminatory 
harms could eliminate opportunities to redress “specific instances of explicit 
discrimination that might be more effectively managed through straightforward 
rights claiming.”416 Civil rights laws must continue to play a role as “backstop[s]” 
against classic forms of discrimination, such as sexual coercion in the workplace, 
or firing a worker for taking family leave.417  
Discriminatory harms are of a different character than harms that affect all 
workers. Universal solutions, at least on paper, would not judge between claims 
based on sexual orientation, marital, parental, or other status.418 But in their 
agnosticism, universal rules fail to treat discriminatory harassment any worse than 
personality conflicts, and fail to protect caregiving responsibilities any better than 
leisure pursuits. This is not to say that anyone deserves to be bullied or that leisure 
time is not worthy of protection, but rather that these problems are of a different 
order than those linked with discrimination.419 Discriminatory harassment and a 
workplace that is incompatible with caretaking obligations are legacies of women’s 
historical marginalization in paid labor (and the inextricably related problem of 
men’s exclusion from caretaking).420 These problems contribute to women’s 
continued disadvantage today.421 Discrimination is a “vicious cycle of exclusion” in 
which those who are subordinated face stereotypes and stigmatization, causing 
them to believe they will be denied opportunities, causing them to “choose” not to 
develop their human capital, causing them to be denied opportunities and 
perpetuating stereotypes and stigmatization.422 Antidiscrimination rules target this 
                                                                                                                 
FMLA leave in 2005). 
 414. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family 
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 122–61 
(2003). 
 415. See Resnik, supra note 412, at 252 (citing William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & 
Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, and 
Claiming . . . , 15 L. & SOC. 631 (1980–81); Austin Sarat, Naming, Blaming, and Claiming 
in Popular Culture, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 425 (2000)). 
 416. Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 393 (2009). 
 417. Cf. Sturm, supra note 25, at 483 (discussing law’s role as backstop).  
 418. See supra Part I.A.2 (describing gaps in sexual harassment law); Part I.B.2 
(describing gaps in family leave policy). 
 419. Cf. Emens, supra note 409, at 894–96. 
 420. As Jeremy Waldron has written,  
Everyone knows that sexual and racial differences have been used in the past to 
justify profound differences of treatment, rights, and social status. . . . We could 
say that respect is due to humanity as such. But “equality” has the extra and 
important resonance of indicating the sort of heritage we are struggling against. 
Jeremy Waldron, The Substance of Equality, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1350, 1363 (1991). 
 421. See Abrams, supra note 254, at 1187 (“Correcting a nonsystematic problem of 
disrespect is a far less urgent matter than curtailing a practice of gender discrimination, 
which imposes consequences on women’s economic and personal well-being and which has 
parallels throughout society.”). 
 422. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the 
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dynamic by expressing condemnation of prejudice and providing incentives for 
those who are excluded to develop their human capital.423 Antidiscrimination law 
disrupts “wholesale” forms of injustice that create patterns and systems of 
subordination, as opposed to “retail” forms of injustice involving individual 
breaches of norms of ethical conduct.424  
To avoid essentialism without going so far as the universal turn, 
antidiscrimination projects can be refocused from protected groups to protected 
activities or prohibited forms of discrimination. Antidiscrimination projects must 
attack rather than reinforce stereotypes about gender, sex, and sexuality. As 
discussed in Part I of this Article, sexual harassment law and family leave policy 
are being pulled away from a focus on discrimination and toward anti-sex and pro-
family agendas. There is a problem with sexual harassment laws that are enforced 
to rid the workplace of sexuality rather than sex discrimination.425 I agree with 
feminist scholars who argue that the law should prohibit any harassment in the 
service of gender stereotyping or segregation.426 There is also a problem with laws 
that support traditional families rather than caretaking.427 Caregivers should be 
provided with paid, job-protected leave. As Gillian Lester proposes, leave should 
be publicly financed to avoid the risks of employers shifting costs onto women or 
other likely caretakers.428 To avoid essentialism, leave programs should be made 
attractive for men as well as women. Empirical research suggests that paid leave, if 
not too long in duration, increases women’s likelihood of returning to the 
workforce.429 Feminists can ground arguments for prioritization of caregiving in the 
state’s duty toward dependent or vulnerable citizens, rather than maternalist notions 
of valuing women’s roles.430  
                                                                                                                 
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 841–43 (2003) (summarizing the 
sociological account of discrimination). 
 423. Id. at 844. 
 424. See id. at 837, 846–47.  
 425. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 426. See Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 691, 745 (1997) (proposing conceptualizing harassment as conduct “used to enforce or 
perpetuate gender norms and stereotypes”); Schultz, supra note 6, at 2173 (proposing that 
the definition of sex harassment include “any type of conduct that occurs because of sex—
regardless of whether it is sexual, nonsexual but overtly sexist, or even gender-neutral in 
content” (emphasis in original)).  
 427. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 428. See, e.g., Lester, supra note 350, at 73 (proposing paid family leave financed 
through across-the-board payroll taxes or general revenue). 
 429. Christopher J. Ruhm, The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave Mandates: 
Lessons from Europe, 113 Q.J. ECON. 285, 287 (1998). 
 430. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY 178 (2004) (arguing that preoccupation with autonomy has prevented 
Americans from seeing that we are all dependents at various points in our lives, and 
proposing that the state support dependent children, the elderly, the disabled, and those who 
care for them); Maxine Eichner, Dependency and the Liberal Polity: On Martha Fineman’s 
The Autonomy Myth, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2005); Fineman, supra note 12, at 23 
(“Equality must be a universal resource, a radical guarantee that is a benefit for all. We must 
begin to think of the state’s commitment to equality as one rooted in an understanding of 
vulnerability and dependency, recognizing that autonomy is not a naturally occurring 
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To avoid underinclusiveness, antidiscrimination protections in the workplace 
should be gradually expanded to include new forms of discrimination that are 
analogous to the old; for example, discrimination based on sexual orientation 
should be prohibited. Such expansions entail identity politics, but, as this analysis 
demonstrates, anti-bullying laws and universal leave policies would entail the same 
political backlash. 
Finally, further study and experimentation is required to address universal 
harms, like nondiscriminatory bullying or work-life conflicts unrelated to 
caretaking responsibilities. Such experimentation could take the form of 
requirements that employers engage in problem solving to devise solutions to 
bullying and work-life conflicts together with employees, government agencies, 
and other stakeholders.431 For example, the mandate of an administrative agency, 
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), could be 
expanded to address bullying.432 OSHA has recognized workplace violence as a 
threat to health and safety,433 and has issued guidelines for prevention of violence 
in high-risk industries.434 Similar approaches could be applied to address work-life 
conflicts. Private solutions that transform workplace norms for everyone, instead of 
creating new tracks as exceptions to the norm, are appealing experiments.435 
Flexible regulatory mechanisms, with a focus on open-ended procedure over 
defined substance, would be good ways to test out solutions before risking the 
assimilation or dilution of antidiscrimination norms.436 Moreover, the types of 
structural and cultural changes required to resolve the broad array of problems that 
have been labeled “bullying” and “work-life conflicts” will differ from workplace 
to workplace. A proliferation of workplace-level approaches, rather than universal 
legal prohibitions, would allow experimentation and study to determine best 
practices, with attention to whether the new programs contribute to or diminish 
status hierarchies.437  
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 431. Cf. Sturm, supra note 25, at 539 (cautioning against “superimposing universal 
solutions over an area where culture and context are key to effective problem solving and 
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 432. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006); Harthill, supra note 8, at 1251. 
 433. See, e.g., OSHA Interpretive Letter from Richard E. Fairfax, OSHA Director, to 
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GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTING WORKPLACE VIOLENCE FOR HEALTH CARE AND SOCIAL 
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 435. See LOTTE BAILYN, BREAKING THE MOLD: REDESIGNING WORK FOR PRODUCTIVE 
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 436. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV 1, 34–37 (2006).  
 437. Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
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CONCLUSION 
As an end goal, universal protection has great appeal. The arguments for 
universal protection demonstrate how “women’s issues” point to problems in the 
structure of the workplace for everyone. But viewed through an antidiscrimination 
lens, a civility code for the American workplace would have significant drawbacks. 
Extending the civil rights model to the problems of bullying and work-life conflicts 
could backfire for those committed to equality, inviting overzealous enforcement of 
gendered norms masquerading as civility codes, making inequality invisible, and 
diluting protections. Closer examination reveals that although the problem of the 
hostile workplace is universal, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. To better fulfill 
the universal turn’s promise of inclusivity, reformers must consider the conflicts 
between equality and universalist projects.  
  
                                                                                                                 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314–15 (1998). But see David Zaring, Best 
Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 300–01 (2006) (concluding that best practices are 
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